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Abstract: 
What began as a financial crisis in the United States in 2007–2008 quickly evolved into a 
massive crisis of the global real economy. We investigate the importance of the bank lending 
and firm borrowing channel in the international transmission of bank distress to the real 
economy—in particular, to real investment and labor employment by nonfinancial firms. We 
analyze whether and to what extent firms are able to compensate for the shortage in loan 
supply by switching banks and by using other types of financing. The analysis is based on a 
unique matched data set for Germany that contains firm-level financial statements for the 
2004–2010 period together with the financial statements of each firm’s relationship bank(s). 
We use instrumental variable estimations in first differences to eliminate firm- and bank-
specific effects. The first stage results show that banks that suffered losses due to proprietary 
trading activities at the onset of the financial crisis reduced their lending more strongly than 
non-affected banks. In the second stage, we find that firms whose relationship banks reduce 
credit supply downsize their real investment and labor employment significantly. This effect 
is larger for firms that are unable to provide much collateral. We document that firms partially 
offset reduced credit supply by establishing new bank relationships, using internal funds, and 
issuing new equity. 
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1 Introduction 
The 2007–2008 financial crisis led to a significant decline in economic output and left the 
U.S. economy injured. In particular, the crisis caused a significant drop in aggregate 
investment, resulting in a total capital stock well below its trend path (Hall 2010, 2014). 
Because capital adjustment is sluggish, this shortfall in real investment during the time of 
crisis has major long-term consequences for the economy, potentially impeding output and 
employment for several years into the future. 
There has been a vigorous debate about whether the U.S. financial crisis also propagated 
to the banking sector of other countries and about the role of multinational banks in the 
transmission process. Allen et al. (2012) and Popov and Udell (2012) show that the activities 
of bank subsidiaries outside the United States are affected by the parent bank’s fragility, its 
losses with respect to financial assets, and its reliance on interbank lending. However, because 
of data restrictions, tracing these effects from the bank to the firm level was difficult. Thus, 
knowledge of how the financial crisis impaired the real economy outside the United States is 
still very limited. Understanding whether events such as the U.S. financial crisis affect the real 
economy in other countries through the bank lending and firm borrowing channel has 
important implications for both the design of financial regulation and crisis management as 
well as the modeling of financial crises. In particular, it is important to understand the 
implications of globalization in banking for firm investment and capital stock; a variable 
through which the financial crisis has had the most enduring impact on growth of the 
postcrisis economy (Hall 2014). 
Thus, the goal of this paper is to understand whether a substantial shock to the financial 
sector (e.g., the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis of 2007–2008) affects credit supply and firm 
investment behavior in a foreign country with stable economic performance, even if the given 
country’s real economy is not directly affected by the initial crisis. We dig deeper by also 
studying the kinds of firms that are affected most by a potential credit rationing. For the first 
time in the literature, we are able to assess whether firms are able to mitigate credit rationing 
in such situations by switching banking partners, by using internal funds, or by issuing new 
equity. 
We address these questions by focusing on the German economy, which is ideally suited 
to provide novel and substantive insights for various reasons. First, Germany did not undergo 
a housing market bubble in the 2000s; unlike in the United States or other European countries, 
there was no significant increase and rapid decline of German housing prices during this 
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period. Second, Germany experienced a period of stable economic performance with a record-
low level of unemployment until 2008, so we do not have to worry about negative domestic 
demand effects at the beginning of the financial crisis. Third, some German banks had 
significant exposure to the U.S. subprime market and were substantially affected by the 
financial crisis (see, e.g., Bertaut et al. 2012). Last not least, Germany is relevant as the largest 
single economy in Europe and the fifth largest economy in the world. 
Our empirical strategy proceeds as follows. We exploit a unique matched database 
containing firm-level financial statements for the 2004–2010 period along with the financial 
statements of the bank(s) with which the given firm had a lending relationship. This enables 
us to study whether banks that were affected at the onset of the financial crisis (because of 
losses from proprietary trading activities) reduced lending to firms relatively more than 
unaffected banks. We are able to distinguish the effect of credit supply from credit demand 
using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, in which our instruments capture a bank’s 
intensity of exposure to the 2007–2008 U.S. financial crisis. We then study whether a bank’s 
contraction in loan supply translates into lower investment rates by the firms that have a 
lending relationship with that bank, holding firms’ investment opportunities constant. The fact 
that we observe each firm’s banking relationships and financial statements enables us to study 
whether and how firms mitigate the shortage in loan supply by establishing new banking 
relationships and by using alternative sources of financing. 
Our data cover firms of all sizes, including small and medium-sized enterprises, which 
are of major importance to the German economy. This broad coverage benefits our analysis in 
two ways: First, the data allow us to identify the kinds of firms for which external debt and 
equity are imperfect substitutes and which are thus affected most by a contraction in credit 
supply.3 We explore three dimensions of firm characteristics suggested as important drivers of 
firms becoming financially constrained: firm size, age (Hadlock and Pierce 2010), and 
tangibility of assets (Hart and Moore 1994; Almeida and Campello 2007). Our analysis sheds 
light on the role of informational asymmetries in explaining the importance of relationship 
bank lending. Whether relationship lending has made German firms more vulnerable to 
shocks to the banking sector in the aftermath of the U.S. financial crisis is an open question 
that deserves further inquiry (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). Second, we can study the 
various adjustment channels firms might use to mitigate credit rationing by their relationship 
                                                 
3 For the different reasons of imperfect capital substitutability see, e.g., Modigliani and Miller (1958), Myers 
(1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984), and Jensen (1986). The relevance of imperfect 
substitutability of debt and equity for firms’ investment decision is highlighted by, e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988), 
Hoshi et al. (1991), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Lamont (1997), and Rauh (2006), and for the impact of 
corporate payout taxation by Becker et al. (2013). 
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banks. In particular, the wide variety of firms in our data allows us to document important 
differences across firms in the ability to compensate for a loss in bank credit by switching to 
other banks or resorting to internal funds and new equity. 
Our analysis yields five main empirical findings. First, banks with large losses from 
proprietary trading and significant exposure to the 2007–2008 U.S. financial crisis reduced 
their loan supply in Germany. Thus, the U.S. financial crisis propagated to the German 
economy through multinational banks. Second, a contraction in overall loan supply from a 
firm’s relationship bank(s) translates into lower firm borrowing. This suggests that 
relationship lending is important in Germany and cannot easily be replaced with loans from 
other banks. We estimate that from 2007 to 2008, the financial crisis caused a decrease in the 
growth rate in debt financing of firms by half due to relationship banks’ losses from 
proprietary trading. Moreover, we find that the effects of a reduction in banks’ long term 
credit supply on firms’ capital structure is even three times stronger than is the impact of a 
change in banks’ overall credit supply. 
Third, firm investment rates respond to a contraction in credit supply: if firms’ 
relationship banks decrease their credit supply, firms have to reduce their real investment. 
Because our IV approach purges any demand effects on the part of the firm from the 
regression, this response shows that shocks in the financial sector transmit to the real 
economy. Overall, the mean net real investment rate of nonfinancial firms in Germany 
decreased by one-fifth in 2008 because of losses from proprietary trading that their 
relationship banks suffered during the financial crisis. Fourth, firms with a lower tangibility of 
assets are more strongly affected by a reduction of loan supply, ceteris paribus, because they 
cannot provide as much collateral. Fifth, firms partly mitigate the contraction in loan supply 
by establishing new bank relationships and by resorting to self-financing. More specifically, 
firms are able to offset almost half of the reduction in debt financing by using their 
accumulated liquid assets (this accounts for 49% of the overall adjustment), reducing dividend 
payments (46%), and increasing nominal capital (5%). Firms differ in their ability to mitigate 
contractions in loan supply and in the adjustment channels they use. Dividend paying firms 
cut back their dividends. Large firms and firms with high asset tangibility are more likely to 
establish new bank relationships, and the former are also more likely to issue new equity. 
Small firms instead rely on accumulated cash. A firm’s ability to establish new bank 
relationships thus appears to positively depend on the quality of information available about 
the firm. Thereby, our findings speak to the question of why firms incur stricter publication 
requirements and become public. All of our results are robust to specification choices. 
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Our first contribution to the literature is to show the partial substitutability of banking 
partners and the ability of firms to switch between different sources of finance such as 
external and internal funds. We also provide evidence for firm heterogeneity in the capacity to 
compensate for a loss in loan supply. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to 
provide comprehensive micro-data evidence on this issue.4 
As a second contribution, our paper adds to the nascent literature on the relationship 
between banks’ securities trading and their lending behavior during a crisis (Shleifer and 
Vishny 2010; Diamond and Rajan 2011; Abbassi et al. 2015). We show that banks suffering 
losses from proprietary trading cut down their loan supply more heavily than other banks. 
Our third contribution to the literature is in presenting evidence on the effects of the 
2007–2008 financial crisis on corporate lending.5 While it is documented that banks sharply 
curtailed lending to the corporate sector during the financial crisis (e.g., in the U.S. context, 
see Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; in the European context, see Popov and Udell 2012), we 
show the importance of relationship lending in this transmission. Firms cannot fully offset a 
contraction in credit supply from their relationship banks by switching to other banks. 
As a fourth contribution we document the effects of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on the 
real economy.6 Data limitations made it difficult to show that shocks to financial markets 
transmit to the real economy.7 In particular, micro data for many countries are only released 
with long time lags and usually contain either bank-level information on credit supply or 
borrower-level information on real outcomes. A number of papers use matched loan data.8 
                                                 
4 In a working paper, Jensen and Johannesen (2015) provide evidence on the effects of the financial crisis on 
consumer behavior and show that individuals respond to a tightening of credit by switching to banks that have 
not been exposed to the crisis. 
5 The financial crisis also renewed interest in the effects of monetary policy on banks’ credit supply and credit 
risk-taking (see, e.g., Jiménez et al. 2012, 2014). 
6 This strand of research builds on earlier papers interested in how financial shocks to banks affect their 
borrowers. For example, Gan (1997) and Amiti and Weinstein (2011) exploit the bursting of the Japanese real 
estate bubble, Ongena et al. (2003) examine the Norwegian bank crisis, Schnabl (2012) looks at the 1998 
Russian default, and Khwaja and Mian (2008) consider how unanticipated nuclear tests in Pakistan affect bank 
liquidity. Ashcraft (2005) shows that bank failures of healthy banks lead to a significant and permanent decline 
in real county income within Texas but is not able to study the effect at the firm level. 
7 There are several papers relating credit supply and the market evaluation of borrowers. For example, Slovin et 
al. (1993) and Baur (2012) find that financial crises lead to an increased co-movement of returns between 
financial sector stocks and the stocks of their borrowers, thereby providing indirect evidence that financial crises 
affect the real economy. A survey of chief financial officers in the United States, Europe, and Asia suggests that 
firms forewent profitable investment opportunities during the crisis as a result of binding external financial 
constraints (Campello et al. 2010), while Claessens et al. (2012) do not find evidence that the 2007–2008 
financial crisis affected the investment levels of firms in advanced and emerging economies. Bricongne et al. 
(2012) examine the effect on international trade and find the overall impact of the financial crisis to be limited. 
8 Amiti and Weinstein (2013) exploit a large sample of matched bank–firm loan data for Japan for the 1990–
2010 period. They trace loan movements back to bank, firm, industry, and common shocks, finding that bank 
supply shocks explain about 40% of aggregate loan and investment fluctuations. Acharya et al. (2014) 
investigate real effects of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe using a matched sample of loan and accounting 
information. 
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However, loan data and loan application data have the limitation that firms expecting not to 
obtain credit are discouraged from applying for credit and are thus missing in the data 
(Chodorow-Reich 2014), so this approach may ignore the most troubled firms. Chodorow-
Reich (2014) addresses this problem by jointly observing employment outcomes of firms and 
the financial information of their banks and finds contractions in employment by firms that 
had precrisis banking relationships with less healthy lenders. 
For lack of similar data on firms’ bank relationships and capital stock, previous studies 
on the effects of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on investment resort to variation in firms’ 
financial liquidity. In particular, they exploit ex ante variation in firms’ long-term debt 
maturity (Almeida et al. 2012) and variation in firms’ internal financial resources (Duchin et 
al. 2010) to document adverse effects of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on corporate 
investment. Our paper differs from these studies in three important dimensions: First, we 
exploit a database that contains both bank-related and firm-related information. Therefore, we 
can compare the investment behavior of firms that had borrowed from banks before the crisis 
that were similar except for their level of affectedness from the financial crisis. Our IV 
approach allows us to determine that the crisis was spread through the bank lending channel 
(the causal transmission of bank health to reduced firm borrowing and investment). This is a 
major advantage over prior literature in which it was difficult to separate the bank lending 
channel from the firm balance-sheet channel.9 Second, we also observe unlisted, small and 
medium-sized firms. Prior investment studies (e.g., Lemmon and Roberts 2010) focus on 
large, public, firms that may find it easier to compensate for bank credit contraction by issuing 
bonds or stocks; in addition, the investment behavior of public firms may be distorted by 
short-termism (Asker et al. 2015). Third, we document that the U.S. financial crisis also 
caused real effects beyond the U.S. economy, in Germany.10  
We thereby also speak to the literature on the effects of the globalization of banking on 
the international transmission of financial shocks (Peek and Rosengren 1997; Chava and 
Purnanandam 2011). Relatively little research exists on how financial crises in one specific 
country transmit to the corporate sector and the real economy in other countries (Peek and 
Rosengren 2000). Our study advances this literature by showing how a large shock to the U.S. 
financial markets affected real investment and employment in Germany. 
                                                 
9 The latter is relevant when an economic downturn devalues assets in firms’ balance sheets and thus their 
collateral and creditworthiness (see the discussion in Jiménez et al. 2012). 
10 Puri et al. (2011) examine the cross-border effects of the 2007–2008 U.S. financial crisis on retail bank lending 
in Germany. They show that savings banks that were indirectly affected by the U.S. financial crisis through their 
holdings in Federal State Banks (Landesbanken) with substantial subprime exposure rejected substantially more 
loan applications than unaffected banks. 
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Finally, this paper adds to the strand of literature that examines the cash flow sensitivity 
of investment of capital-constrained and capital-unconstrained firms (cf. Lamont 1997; Rauh 
2006; Almeida and Campello 2007; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008; Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist 
forthcoming). We shed light on this question from a different angle by focusing on whether 
investment decisions are determined by loan supply shocks and by providing evidence on 
adjustment channels used to mitigate credit supply contractions by different types of firms. 
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant features of the 
financial system in Germany. Section 3 introduces our data, and Section 4 describes the 
empirical methodology we use. Section 5 presents our empirical results on the impact of 
credit supply by relationship banks on firm borrowing. Section 6 presents results on the real 
economy effects: firms’ investment and employment decisions as well as heterogeneity in 
responses. Section 7 explores potential adjustment channels of firms. Section 8 offers some 
concluding remarks. Appendices A, B and C contain additional empirical results. 
2 German banks, the U.S. financial crisis, and lending 
Three features of the German financial system are central to our study: First, it is bank based 
rather than capital-market based and relationship lending is important. Second, many German 
banks engaged in proprietary trading activities and were affected by the U.S. financial crisis. 
Third, like in other countries, banking regulation puts limits on credit supply to bank 
customers on the basis of bank balance sheet indicators. In the following, we describe each of 
these three institutional features in greater detail. 
2.1 The predominant role of bank financing and relationship lending 
In Germany, domestic banking sector assets exceeded 300% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
before the financial crisis (compared with approximately 70% in the United States), thus 
demonstrating the importance of banks for the German economy. In contrast, equity markets 
have traditionally been less important for financing businesses: The ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP was only about one-third (45%) of that observed in the United States 
(130%) before the crisis.11 The predominant role of bank financing is also reflected in firms’ 
balance sheets: Bank loans account for 60% of total long-term corporate debt in Germany12 
(only 20% in the United States) and represent the lion’s share of newly borrowed capital, 
                                                 
11 See Deutsche Börse (2003). 
12 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2010), extrapolated results from financial statements of German enterprises from 
1997 to 2009 (Table I). 
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while the issuance of corporate bonds plays a minor role (the share of bonds issued in newly 
borrowed capital is 10%13 compared with 50% in the United States). 
These differences in financing can be explained partly by the importance of small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Germany (the German Mittelstand). Access to financial markets 
for these firms is more limited due to their smaller size (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Harhoff and 
Körting 1998). Usual information asymmetries are aggravated between small and medium-
sized firms and investors because these firms are (1) less likely to be monitored by rating 
agencies; (2) younger, thus having a shorter track record; and (3) subject to weaker disclosure 
requirements. All these factors increase the importance of sticky bank–borrower relationships 
as a way to mitigate information asymmetries (Diamond 1991; Hoshi et al. 1991; for an 
overview of the theoretical foundations, see Petersen and Rajan 1994). Therefore, German 
firms have traditionally maintained stable, long-term business relationships with one (or 
several) relationship bank(s) (Hausbank).14 If bank–borrower relationships matter for the 
lending process, borrowers cannot easily switch banks when their relationship bank becomes 
liquidity constrained (Slovin et al. 1993). While banking relationships remain important 
during a financial crisis, sticky bank–borrower relationships make firms vulnerable if their 
particular relationship banks get into distress (Sette and Gobbi 2015). 
2.2 German banks engaged in trading and were affected by the U.S. financial crisis 
Most German banks are universal banks, i.e., they are active as both commercial and 
investment banks (in addition to providing insurance and other financial services). Universal 
banks in Germany account for 97% of all institutions and 75% of assets (Hüfner 2010). The 
combination of different banking activities under one roof makes the lending activities of 
German banks particularly susceptible to liquidity and equity shocks from investment 
activities. 
The German banking system is highly fragmented. There are three kinds of banks (“three 
pillars”): public sector banks, local cooperative banks, and private banks. All these banks 
usually operate as universal banks and many of them engage in proprietary trading. Some 
specifics of public sector banks are important for our analysis. They include savings banks 
(owned by municipalities)15 and Federal State Banks (Landesbanken, which are owned by the 
                                                 
13 See Deutsche Börse (2001). 
14 Puri and Rocholl (2008) and Puri et al. (2013) provide evidence on the importance of retail banking 
relationships in Germany. 
15 Six (out of 431) savings banks are not owned by municipalities: Bordesholmer Sparkasse AG, Die Sparkasse 
Bremen AG, Hamburger Sparkasse AG, Sparkasse zu Lübeck AG, Sparkasse Mittelholstein AG, and Sparkasse 
Westholstein. 
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regional savings banks and by the federal state in which they are located).16 Federal State 
Banks act as a central institution for the regional savings banks (e.g., financing infrastructure 
projects) and as main bank for the federal state in which they are located. Together, public 
banks accounted for approximately 40% of total assets before the crisis.17 
The importance of the aforementioned roles as a public institution, however, has tapered 
off, and Federal State Banks have increasingly operated on an international scale (Puri et al. 
2011). These business operations are backed up by the public founding entities, which have 
guaranteed that the bank can meet its financial obligations at all times (by providing liquidity 
support and capital injections if needed). Among several Federal State Banks, the guarantees 
have caused excessive risk taking and significant exposure to international financial risks. 
German banks were severely hit at the onset of the U.S. financial crisis because they had 
invested heavily in structured credit products in the United States. Columns (2) and (3) in 
Table 1 show the investment of selected German banks in toxic conduit- and special 
investment vehicle–financed assets before the crisis. In total, the investment of German banks 
in toxic assets was estimated to be 230 billion euros (Hüfner 2010). These investments led to 
significant write-downs of several billions of euros in 2007 and 2008 (see column (4) of Table 
1). According to Bloomberg18, 7% of global write-downs on such assets between 2007 and 
2009 can be attributed to German banks.19 
The write-downs over the course of the U.S. financial crisis significantly burdened the 
result of banks’ proprietary trading activities and caused massive problems for several 
German banks. As such, the U.S. financial crisis directly affected banks’ financial scope for 
supplying credit to customers. Furthermore, several private banks and Federal State Banks 
needed to be rescued by owner or government interventions to prevent default. Because the 
affected Federal State Banks are partly owned by savings banks, which had to make 
guarantees or equity injections, the write-downs in the wake of the crisis also indirectly 
narrowed the financial scope for some of the savings banks. 
In addition, firm lending also became less attractive to healthy banks due to potentially 
high returns from investment in fire sales. Anticipating a potential fire sale, banks with 
liquidity and with the ability to identify attractive trading opportunities thus had an incentive 
                                                 
16 Savings banks also offer universal services but are limited in their regional lending activity to the municipality 
in which they are located (“regional principle”). Their legal mandate is not to maximize profits but rather to 
provide financial services to their region and to strengthen competition in the banking sector. 
17 World Bank Financial Regulation Database, values for 2005. 
18 Values from Bloomberg series WDCI. 
19 In 2010, German banks’ portfolios still contained substantial amounts of structured products (total of more 
than 200 billion euros; Deutsche Bundesbank 2010). 
 9 
to reduce credit supply on their part (Vishny and Shleifer 2010; Diamond and Rajan 2011; 
Abbassi et al. 2015).20 
Table 1: Exposure of Selected German Banks to U.S. Structured Credit Products 
 Ownership Conduit- and special 
investment vehicle–financed 




  … in % of 
capital 
… in % of 
assets 
… in bn. US$ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sachsen LB Public (Federal State Bank) 1126 30.3 2.5 
WestLB Public (Federal State Bank) 542 12.7 4.6 
IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank AG 
Private 494 20.5 14.8 
Dresdner Bank AG Private 364 9.9 3.9 
Landesbank Berlin Public (Federal State Bank) 179 2.2 unknown 
Bayern LB Public (Federal State Bank) 170 5.1 6.9 
HSH Nordbank Public (Federal State Bank) 126 4 3.5 
Deutsche Bank AG Private 114 3.3 10.4 
HypoVereinsbank AG Private 105 6.6 unknown 
Nord LB Public (Federal State Bank) 89 2.9 unknown 
Commerzbank AG Private 85 2.2 2.3 
Helaba Public (Federal State Bank) 68 1.1 unknown 
DZ-Bank AG Co-operative 61 1.3 2.6 
LB Baden-Württemberg Public (Federal State Bank) 59 1.7 4.7 
KfW Public 58 2.6 unknown 
Notes: Comparability is limited by different dates and varying definitions. 
Source: See Hüfner (2010), Table 1 (which is based on Fitch Ratings (2007), “ABCP Concerns Trigger 
Liquidity Issues for German Banks,” Germany Special Report, August) and Onaran/Pierson, Bloomberg, 
September 29, 2008 (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSlW.imTKzY8, last 
accessed on April 13, 2015). 
 
2.3 Banking regulation sets limits to money creation and credit supply 
The Eurosystem and banking regulation set certain limits on bank money creation and credit 
supply by banks. First, the European Central Bank (ECB) requires credit institutions to hold 
compulsory deposits on accounts with the national central banks.21 Second, banking 
regulation requires a bank to hold a certain amount of equity capital for every credit risk or 
other risk it takes.22 The regulations imply that banks suffering losses may not be able to 
                                                 
20 For our IV strategy, we rely on a non-zero correlation of gains and losses from proprietary trading with credit 
supply to firms, but we do not require assumptions about the specific nature of this correlation. 
21 In the period of the current analysis, the minimum reserve requirement was 2% of the sight deposits that 
nonbanks hold at a bank. Thus, banks cannot lend more than 50 times the amount they hold as central bank 
money. To obtain central bank money in central bank credit operations, banks have to provide collateral. During 
the financial crisis, the ECB extended the range of assets it accepted as collateral several times to sustain 
liquidity in the financial market (European Central Bank 2013). 
22 According to the rules of the Basel I accord, which were in place through the end of 2006, credit lent to 
business customers had to be backed by 8% equity capital. Since 2007, according to the refined rules of the Basel 
II accord, the 8% equity capital requirement is weighted by the default risk of the credit (i.e., the 
creditworthiness of the customer). Subsequently, the financial crisis led to the development of stricter 
regulations. According to the “Basel 2.5” rules of 2009, certain securities have to be backed by more equity 
capital than before. Since 2014, after the period of this analysis, the Basel III accord requires banks to provide 
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provide further credit if their equity falls below the capital adequacy requirement. Even if the 
equity is still above the threshold, internal risk management may induce banks to restrict 
lending when losses occur because the smaller equity buffer implies a larger risk of falling 
below the threshold in the future. In the case of universal banks active in both proprietary 
trading and commercial banking, large losses from proprietary trading may thus spill over 
through the impact to the common equity base, resulting in a reduction of their commercial 
lending activity.23 
3 Individual matched firm and bank panel data 
3.1 Linking bank and firm data via individual bank relationships 
Our database consists of financial statements of nonfinancial German firms linked with the 
financial statements of each firms’ relationship bank(s). Both data sources are provided by 
Bureau van Dijk. Dafne, the financial statements database of nonfinancial firms, includes 
information for the 2004–2010 period, and since 2006, it covers more than 85% of all 
incorporated firms in Germany, the majority of which are unlisted.24 Because small firms are 
not required to publish their income statements, sales and profit information are only available 
for a subsample.25 Besides the unconsolidated balance sheet and income statements, the 
database includes further information such as the set of bank(s) a firm reports as its 
relationship bank(s). We observe the names and bank identification codes of the relationship 
banks but not the amount borrowed from them. All this information is updated regularly, 
usually at the end of the financial year. 
Using the identification codes of the relationship banks, we merge unconsolidated 
financial statements of each relationship bank with each single firm. The bank financial 
statements stem from the Bankscope database of banks active in Germany from 2004 to 
                                                                                                                                                         
generally more equity capital and has also introduced new liquidity standards (for details on the Basel 
regulations, see, e.g., Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 2010). The overall Tier 1 capital ratio must not fall below 
4%. 
23 More than 99.9% of the firms and banks in our sample publish their financial statements according to the 
German Commercial Code (HGB). Because we use gains and losses from proprietary trading as reported in the 
income statement according to the German Commercial Code, these gains and losses affect regulatory capital. In 
contrast to the German Commercial Code, according to US-GAAP or IFRS, losses from the valuation of 
available for sale-securities would usually belong to Other Comprehensive Income (cf. Lachnit 2005). 
24 The coverage of financial statements of incorporated firms is very high due to strict publication requirements. 
25 According to Art. 267 of the German Commercial Code valid until 2008 (since 2009), small firms fulfill at 
least two of the following three conditions: (1) total assets do not exceed 4.015 (4.84) million euros, (2) sales do 
not exceed 8.03 (9.68) million euros, and/or (3) the number of employees is equal to or less than 50. 
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2010.26 It includes balance sheets and income statements as well as information on ownership, 
affiliated companies, and branches. A comparison with the German Bank Statistics provided 
by the German Central Bank shows that Bankscope covers, on average, 83% of all banks in 
Germany over this period.27 
3.2 Firm and bank characteristics and time trends 
Firm characteristics. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample. The 
average firm has a balance sheet total (total assets) of 10.9 million euros, fixed assets of 2.2 
million euros, and liabilities of 4.8 million euros.28 The annual growth rates of fixed assets 
and liabilities are, on average, 1.1% and 0.6%, respectively, and exhibit substantial variation 
between and within firms. Based on the smaller sample of firms for which sales information is 
available, the average turnover amounts to 28 million euros, with an average annual growth of 
1.8%. 
The firms in our sample have, on average, 1.4 relationship banks. Almost half of the 
firms have at least one savings bank as a banking partner, 20% have a local cooperative bank, 
and 33% have one of the large private banks. 
Of the firms in our sample, 1.7% establish an additional bank relationship in a given year, 
and about the same percentage terminate an existing bank partnership, such that the average 
change in the number of relationship banks is close to zero. Altogether, 3% of firms swap a 
relationship bank for another in any given year, keeping the number of relationship banks 
constant. Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that firm–bank relationships are stable 
over time, presumably because establishing a new banking relationship is costly for firms, as 
it involves developing a reputation for nonopportunistic behavior to counteract informational 
asymmetries (Harhoff and Körting 1998). 
                                                 
26 The data also include subsidiaries of foreign banks but excludes branches of foreign banks. Fillat et al. (2015) 
shed light on the question how branches and subsidiaries differ in their response to regulation and in the 
diffusion of financial shocks. 
27 Our estimations focus on the period from 2006 to 2010. Because our regressions are based on first differences 
(see Section 4.1) and include lagged control variables in first differences, we exploit data from 2004 to 2010. Our 
raw sample of firms with at least three consecutive years of observations includes approximately 900,000 firm-
year observations. We drop the smallest firms with total assets worth less than 10,000 euros (US$ 6960 on 
January 1, 2010) as well as firms in the real estate industry because these firms might be directly affected by the 
subprime market crisis in the United States. For 507,457 of the 699,104 firm-year observations left after applying 
this first sample restriction, we are able to match bank statements for all relationship banks at least from 2007 
and onward. Our last sampling step concerns the availability of information on long-term lending by all 
relationship banks of a firm, which leaves us with 291,079 firm-year observations in the final sample. From the 
1700 banks, on average, in Bankscope per year, almost 90% have a lending relationship with at least one firm 
covered in our final sample. For approximately 70% of the banks covered in Bankscope, we also observe 
information on long-term lending. 
28 For both the growth rates of fixed assets and liabilities, we exclude the bottom and top 1% from the sample to 
avoid a situation in which outliers drive the estimated coefficients. Regarding the number of employees, we only 
include firms with more than 5 employees in the analysis. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Firms 






Dependent variables       
Liabilities in th. Euros 4797 155,648 101 280 896 291,079 
Liabilities, growth rate 0.006 0.498 -0.209 -0.007 0.214 291,079 
Fixed assets in th. Euros 2183 69,317 27 72 278 291,079 
Fixed assets, growth rate 0.011 0.431 -0.223 -0.054 0.152 291,079 
Number of employees 202 1695 22 63 145 36,843 
Number of employees, growth rate 0,012 0.164 -0.014 0 0.048 36,843 
Control variables       
Ratio of liabilities to total assets 0.540 0.299 0.281 0.543 0.805 291,079 
Sales in th. Euros 28,370 502,955 700 1800 6000 88,153 
Sales, growth rate 0.018 0.305 -0.010 0.000 0.070 88,153 
Business tax rate 0.322 0.046 0.28 0.31 0.37 291,079 
Change in business tax rate -0.021 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.038 291,079 
Variables on relationship banks       
Number of relationship banks 1.404 0.684 1 1 2 291,079 
Savings bank among relationship banks (yes=1) 0.481     291,079 
  Thereof: Savings bank affected by the crisis 0.149     291,079 
Local cooperative bank among relationship 
banks (yes=1) 
0.195     291,079 
Other bank among relationship banks (yes=1) 0.570     291,079 
  Thereof: Large private bank 0.332     291,079 
Avg. growth rate in credit supply from 
relationship banks 
0.024 0.117 -0.016 0.017 0.056 291,079 
Avg. growth rate in long-term credit supply 
from relationship banks 
0.010 0.220 -0.031 0.005 0.047 291,079 
Share of relationship banks with losses from 
proprietary trading 0.172 0.346 0 0 0 291,079 
Gains and losses from proprietary trading to 
financial assets -0.001 0.013 0 0 0 291,079 
At least one additional bank relationship 0.017     158,760 
At least one bank relationship less 0.017     158,760 
Change in number of relationship banks -0.002 0.224    158,760 
Annual rate of substitution of a new 
relationship bank for an existing one 
0.030 0.171    158,760 
Additional variables       
Total assets in th. Euros 10,876 368,147 254 604 1789 291,079 
Firm age in years 17 14 9 14 20 291,079 
Ratio of tangible assets to total assets 0.291 0.234 0.103 0.222 0.428 291,079 
Nominal capital in th. Euros 722 24,294 26 26 52 288,414 
Nominal capital, growth rate 0.002 0.158 0 0 0 288,414 
Cash in th. Euros 779 28,947 16 69 247 243,278 
Cash, growth rate 0.033 0.888 -0.446 0.015 0.512 243,278 
Dividends in th. Euros 291 12,130 0 0 0 220,830 
Dividends, growth rate 0.016 1.759 0 0 0 220,830 
Notes: The main sample, which covers firms for which all variables used in the main estimations are observed, 
includes 291,079 firm-year observations for 2006–2010. The additional variables are used for effect heterogeneity 
and the analysis of adjustment channels. Information on some of these variables is not available for all firms and 
years in the main sample, which leads to a smaller number of firm-year observations reported in the rightmost 
column. For the calculation of the growth rate of dividend payments, we added 1 before taking logs as otherwise 
only dividend paying firms would be in the sample. Further, the cash variables are only shown for firms with a 
growth rate of cash below the top and above the bottom 3% of the distribution. For dummy variables, only the 
mean and the number of observations are reported. “Large private bank” refers to Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank, HypoVereinsbank/UniCredit, and Postbank (Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank merged in 2009). 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne, 2006–2010; growth rates 
also use 2005. 
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The average business tax rate amounts to 32%. It includes the corporate income tax rate, 
the mandatory so-called solidarity surcharge, and the local business tax rate. The rates of the 
latter depend on the location of the firm and differ across each of the more than 12,000 
German municipalities as well as over time within individual jurisdictions. They range from a 
minimum tax rate of 9% to about 20%, with an average rate of approximately 16% (Fossen 
and Bach 2008).29 The combined business tax rate has substantial time-series variation due to 
the corporate tax reform in 2008, which reduced the corporate income tax rate from 25% to 
15% and also included changes in the local business tax.30 
Bank characteristics. The descriptive statistics for the relationship banks of the firms 
included in our sample appear in Table 3. Germany’s three-pillar system is reflected in the 
data: Of the relationship banks, 28% are saving banks, 29% are local cooperative banks, and 
the remaining 43% are other private banks. Due to a few very large private banks, the average 
of total assets is 5.8 billion euros, whereas the median is only 489 million euros. The average 
annual growth rate of credit and long-term credit supplied is 2.6% and 1.8%, respectively. The 
mean gains from proprietary trading are 165,000 euros. Only a quarter of banks engage in 
proprietary trading; conditional on trading, the mean gains are 659,000 euros. 
U.S. financial crisis shows up in returns from proprietary trading. Figure 1 depicts 
the evolution of banks’ gains and losses from proprietary trading scaled by financial assets 
(which do not include loans provided by the bank), conditional on proprietary trading 
activities. There is a clear dip for the median bank in 2008, which is even more pronounced at 
the first and third quartiles of the distribution. Figure 1 thus suggests that German banks with 
proprietary trading activities were indeed adversely affected by the U.S. financial crisis. 
                                                 
29 We match the local business tax rates provided by the Federal Statistical Office using the postal codes of the 
firms. 
30 Further changes due to the corporate tax reform pertain to the generosity of depreciation allowances and 
special anti-avoidance provisions such as new thin capitalization rules (see, e.g., Buslei and Simmler 2012). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Firms’ Relationship Banks 






Type of bank 
      
Savings bank 0.280     6640 
Thereof: Savings bank affected by the 
crisis 
0.119     6640 
Local cooperative bank 0.292     6640 
Other private bank 0.428     6640 
Explanatory variables 
      
Total assets in th. euros 5,817,691 55,932,584 197,300 488,650 1,274,600 6640 
Credit supply in th. euros 2,287,862 16,005,645 104,400 267,250 705,950 6640 
Ratio of credit supply to total assets 0.567 0.144 0.491 0.582 0.658 6640 
Credit supply, growth rate 0.026 0.080 -0.009 0.018 0.048 6623 
Long-term credit supply in th. euros 979,880 4,746,310 59,300 154,500 412,100 6640 
Ratio of long-term credit supply to total 
assets 
0.339 0.109 0.283 0.350 0.410 6640 
Long-term credit supply, growth rate 0.018 0.099 -0.024 0.010 0.050 5529 
Instrumental variables 
      
Gains from proprietary trading in th. euros 165 149,350 0 0 0 6640 
Gains from proprietary trading conditional 
on trading 
659 298,498 100 100 400 1663 
Additional variables 
      
Financial assets (w/o credit) in th. euros 1,438,360 13,002,858 17,100 78,450 249,050 6640 
Ratio of other earning assets to total assets 0.386 0.144 0.293 0.371 0.464 6640 
Ratio of deposits to total assets 0.876 0.081 0.863 0.895 0.916 6640 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.105 0.030 0.084 0.099 0.121 482 
Ratio of equity to total assets 0.066 0.032 0.052 0.061 0.074 6640 
Notes: The main sample includes 6640 bank-year observations. It includes all banks that were indicated as a 
relationship bank by at least one firm in the firm sample and for which information was provided on all variables 
used in the main estimations. Information on some of the variables reported here is not available for all banks and 
years in this sample, which leads to a smaller number of bank-year observations reported in the rightmost 
column. For dummy variables, only the mean and the number of observations are reported. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the bank financial accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; growth 
rates also use 2005. 
 
When a financial crisis is transmitted to the real economy through the bank lending 
channel, trading banks will contract their loan supply, compared with non-trading banks. This 
is because trading banks suffer losses from proprietary trading activities, or because of more 
attractive trading opportunities, which arise from looming fire sales. As Figure B1 in 
Appendix B shows, this is exactly what we observe once the U.S. financial crisis hit. 
Comparing banks with and without proprietary trading activities in 2005 and 2006 reveals that 
time trends in loan supply growth (indexed at 2006 = 1) are very similar for both groups 
before the crisis. However, after the financial crisis began in 2007, the credit amount lent by 
trading banks falls behind notably. The difference in credit supply between the two groups is 
even more pronounced when we consider the growth of long-term credit (see Figure B2 in 
Appendix B), in particular beginning in 2008 when the returns from proprietary trading 
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dipped (Figure 1). This evidence indicates that trading banks reduce their credit supply 
relative to other banks. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Banks’ Gains and Losses from Proprietary Trading over Time 
 
Notes: Quartiles of nonzero gains and losses from proprietary trading activities of the banks in the sample, 
normalized by the bank’s financial assets. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the bank financial accounts database Bankscope, 2004–2010. 
 
If relationship banking is important and firms cannot easily switch to other financing 
sources, the reduction in loan supply from some banks will transmit to their business 
customers and reduce real investment at the firm level. Figure B3 in Appendix B suggests that 
this happened in the aftermath of the U.S. financial crisis. It depicts the growth of fixed assets 
for the firms in our sample. We distinguish firms with only relationship banks engaging in 
proprietary trading activities, firms with only relationship banks not engaging in proprietary 
trading activities, or a mixture of both. Before 2008, the time trends appear similar. In 2009, 
firms whose relationship banks are all engaging in proprietary trading show a slower growth 
of fixed assets than firms whose relationship banks did not trade, though the difference is not 
that large. This suggests that real investment is impaired by lending relationships with trading 
banks. The small relative slowdown of investment compared with the larger relative decline in 
credit supply indicates that firms may partly compensate for the decline in credit supplied by 
using alternative financing. In the next section, we discuss the empirical methodology we use 
to explore the causal effect of bank lending on firm borrowing, investment, and employment, 











2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
25% quantile median 75% quantile
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4 Empirical methodology 
4.1 The effect of credit supply on firm borrowing, real investment and employment 
Our goal is to estimate the responses of firms to a contraction in loan supply by their 
relationship banks. We expect effects on financing, investment and possibly employment if 
capital markets are imperfect and information asymmetries between firms and investors exist. 
If firms cannot fully compensate for a contraction in their relationship banks’ loan supply by 
borrowing from other banks, the overall amount borrowed by the firm will decrease. Further, 
if other sources of financing cannot fully substitute for the reduction in bank credit, firms will 
have to forego real investment opportunities, and possibly they will also reduce employment. 
To assess whether credit supply by relationship banks affects firm outcomes, we start out with 
the following model: 
log(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2 log(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) 
                                     +𝛽3𝑡 + 𝜷𝟒
′  𝒙𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓
′  𝒘𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔
′  𝑡 𝒘𝒊 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where i indicates firms, t indicates years, and bold letters indicate vectors. In the main 
estimations, the outcome variable yit is one of the following: i.) a firm’s amount of liabilities;31 
ii.) a firm’s stock of fixed assets (book values); or iii.) a firm’s number of employees. We 
define the main explanatory variable credit supplyit as the book value of all loans that a firm’s 
relationship banks grant to their customers (excluding inter-bank credits). We also include the 
first time lag of credit supplyit in the model to account for possible dynamic effects. 
The coefficients 1 and 2 are of primary interest. If consistently estimated, they can be 
interpreted as elasticities, and 1, 2 > 0 imply that a reduction in the amount of credit 
supplied by a firm’s relationship bank(s) reduces the firm’s outcome variable yit. The 
contemporaneous and lagged growth rates of credit supplyit are endogenous, and we apply an 
IV approach to consistently estimate the coefficients, as we explain in the following 
subsection. 
The vector of time-varying control variables xit includes the tax rate on business profits 
and its first time lag to account for possibly dynamic effects of taxation on investment. As we 
mention in Section 3.2, there is substantial time-series and regional variation in the tax rate, 
which makes it a potentially important control variable. In robustness checks based on a 
subsample, xit additionally includes a firm’s total value of sales as a measure of firm size 
                                                 
31 Our notion of liabilities does not include pension commitments, which play a minor role in Germany because 
of the statutory pension insurance system. It does contain non-interest bearing liabilities such as trade payables. 
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(income statements and thus sales are available for less than one-third of the firms in our main 
sample). 
Time-invariant observable characteristics are collected in the vector wi. This vector 
includes the shares of two specific bank types in an individual firm’s set of banking partners 
in 2006. Specifically, this is the share of savings banks that were financially affected by the 
crisis (due to the capital injections they needed to provide to their Federal State Banks) and 
the share of banks with U.S. affiliates. We discuss this further below when we introduce our 
instrumental variables. We control for linear time trends that may differ by the values of these 
time-invariant firm characteristics by including interactions of t and wi. Furthermore, we 
account for time effects t that are common to all firms to pick up business cycle effects. 
The model represented in eq. (1) includes observed and unobserved firm fixed effects 𝒘𝒊 
and i, respectively. To avoid bias due to unobserved firm heterogeneity, we eliminate all 
time-invariant characteristics by first-differencing eq. (1). Using the common log 
approximation of a relative change, log(𝑦𝑖𝑡) − log(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) ≈
∆𝑦
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
, the equation in first 









+ 𝛽3 + 𝜷𝟒
′  ∆𝒙𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔
′  𝒘𝒊 + ∆𝜃𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡.  (2) 
The dependent variable is the one-year growth rate in yit. In particular, if yit is the capital 
stock, the dependent variable in eq. (2) is real net investment relative to the stock of fixed 
assets. The key explanatory variables are the current and lagged one-year growth rates in the 
credit volume that the firm’s relationship banks lend to their customers. If a firm has more 
than one relationship bank, we take the average of the banks’ growth rates. 
One might argue that as long as one of the relationship banks is healthy, the firm should 
not be affected by the problems of the other banking partners; a healthy relationship bank 
could make up for any contraction in loan supply from the firm’s other relationship banks. 
Therefore, in robustness checks, we use the maximum of the growth rates of credit supply 
from all banking partners instead of the average—that is, we consider a firm’s best-
performing bank only—and find very similar results (reported in Table C2 in Appendix C). 
4.2 Endogeneity and IV approach 
Endogeneity of credit supply. We apply a two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV approach 
because credit supplyit and its time lag in the estimation eq. (2) are expected to be endogenous 
for four reasons. First, we measure the bank’s loan volume, which is determined by supply 
and demand. Demand for credit, however, depends on a firm’s investment opportunities, 
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which are likely reduced during the crisis. Thus, we would expect positive coefficients in an 
ordinary least squares regression even if there was no causal effect of credit supply, e.g., on 
the firms’ capital stock. To isolate the supply effect from the demand effect, we require supply 
shifters as IVs, which are correlated with the bank’s credit supply but are independent from 
credit demand. 
Second, we do not observe the growth rate of the loans a bank grants to a specific firm 
but rather the growth rate of the bank’s total loans supplied to all its customers. This 
corresponds to the growth rate of loans granted to a specific firm measured with error. The IV 
method econometrically accounts for measurement error. 
Third, we aim to identify the bank lending channel—that is, the causal transmission from 
bank credit supply to reduced firm borrowing and investment—isolated from the firm balance 
sheet channel. The firm balance sheet channel describes reduced credit flow due to a 
devaluation of a firm’s assets and, thus, of the collateral the firm can provide. Prior literature 
finds it difficult to separate the channels because bank distress and devaluation of firms’ 
assets often occur simultaneously in an economic downturn. We thus require instruments that 
are related to the bank’s credit supply and independent of the balance sheets of the firms. 
Fourth, firms may change their relationship banks because they do not obtain the desired 
credit from their initial banking partners. This endogenously changes the explanatory variable 
of interest, namely, the credit supply of the current relationship banks. Therefore, we require 
instruments that are independent of changes in the firm-specific set of relationship banks. 
Gains and losses from proprietary trading as IV. Our first excluded instrument is the 
amount of gains and losses from proprietary trading of the banks that the firm had a banking 
relationship with in 2006 (before the crisis), normalized by financial assets (excluding credit 
supplied).32 We consider the average value of all banking partners if a firm has more than one 
relationship bank. We expect the two requirements for the validity of the IV to hold, relevance 
and exogeneity. First, the IV likely explains a bank’s lending behavior (relevance): Banks 
suffering losses from proprietary trading experience a decline in their equity and are, 
consequently, likely to reduce lending (see Sections 2.3 and 3.2). We measure the strength of 
the IV in first-stage regressions, in which we empirically explore the relationship between 
proprietary trading gains and lending. 
                                                 
32 To avoid endogeneity from firms changing their relationship banks, we fix the firm-specific set of relationship 
banks as observed in 2006 (before the U.S. financial crisis hit) for all subsequent years when we construct the 
IVs. Thus, changes in the set of banking partners do not affect the instruments. If the information on the 
relationship banks is missing for a firm in 2006, we use the information from 2007 instead. 
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Second, the assumption that a bank’s gains and losses from proprietary trading are 
exogenous to the firm and can be excluded from the firm’s borrowing, investment and 
employment equations, controlling for credit supply, is highly plausible (exogeneity 
assumption). Gains and losses from proprietary trading are independent of a bank’s 
customers’ business, by definition: Proprietary trading activities are defined as the financial 
trading activities that a bank conducts on its own account with the aim of generating profits 
and that are unrelated to business with its customers. Especially in the context of the 
unexpected and sudden financial crisis, a specific bank’s losses from proprietary trading in 
securities in the U.S. are clearly unrelated to their specific German firm customers’ business. 
Nevertheless, exogeneity of this instrument could be compromised if the changes in a 
firm’s outcome variables differed between firms with trading and nontrading relationship 
banks for reasons other than the change in credit supply. However, Appendix B shows that 
precrisis trends in overall credit (Figure B1) and long-term credit (Figure B2) were similar for 
the two types of banks, and investment trends by firm customers of the two types of banks 
were also similar before the crisis (Figure B3). This suggests that there is no systematic 
difference between the two types of banks from the perspective of the firm customers apart 
from the asymmetric shock to credit supply during the financial crisis that we exploit. 
Furthermore, descriptive statistics show that the industry compositions of the firm customers 
of trading and non-trading banks are similar.33,34 
In summary, there is no reason to expect a bank’s gains and losses from proprietary 
trading activities to directly influence firms’ investment and employment decisions; we only 
expect an indirect effect through the bank lending and firm borrowing channel that we are 
explicitly modelling. Thus, proprietary trading gains of banks are exogenous from the 
viewpoint of individual firms, so the exclusion restriction required for the IV approach holds. 
Affected savings banks as second IV. As a second excluded instrument, we adopt Puri 
et al.’s (2011) idea and exploit the notion that certain savings banks were affected by the 
                                                 
33 On average, trading banks are larger than nontrading banks (see Table A1 in Appendix A). This is due to a 
small number of very large private banks among the trading banks. To assess whether certain types of firms 
select certain types of banking partners, we report firm characteristics by bank type in Table A2. Trading banks 
have larger firm customers on average, which is due to a selection of large firms to large banks. Apart from 
average firm size, however, firm characteristics across types of banking partners are very similar, for example, in 
terms of the industry composition. Moreover, not only large private banks, but also significant numbers of saving 
banks and local cooperative banks engage in proprietary trading (see Table A1). Also note that any differences in 
the levels of the outcome variables between customers of trading and nontrading banks leave our estimation 
results unaffected as they are controlled by first-differencing. 
34 Furthermore, the isolation of the bank lending channel from the firm balance sheet channel through our IV 
approach would fail if firms invested in similar financial assets as their relationship banks in their proprietary 
trading activities because shocks to a firm’s value of assets would be correlated with its banks’ trading losses. 
However, this is highly unlikely because structured credit market products such as collateralized debt obligations 
were predominantly held by banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and investment trusts, not by firms. 
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financial crisis while other savings banks were not. The affected savings banks have 
substantial holdings in certain Federal State Banks, which had significant exposure to the U.S. 
subprime market and were deeply impacted by the financial crisis.35 As discussed in Section 
2.2, the affected savings banks had to make guarantees or equity injections into the distressed 
Federal State Banks, which reduced their willingness and ability to lend to business 
customers. Following Puri et al. (2011), we identify these savings banks by their location in 
the same federal state as the affected Federal State Banks. We compute the share of affected 
savings banks in a firm’s set of relationship banks in 2006, before the crisis hit. Although we 
fix this variable to a precrisis year, the initial choice of relationship banks might be 
nonrandom, so we include this characteristic in the vector of time-invariant controls wi. The 
excluded IV is an interaction of this characteristic with a dummy variable indicating the 
period starting in 2007, when we expect the financial crisis to have affected the savings banks 
(cf. Puri et al. 2011). Thus, identification in the IV approach only exploits the changed 
lending behavior of the affected savings banks during the crisis.36 This second IV adds 
information to the first IV because the indirect exposure of the savings banks to the financial 
crisis through their holdings in Federal States Banks does not appear in the gains and losses 
from their proprietary trading. 
The availability of two excluded IVs for one endogenous explanatory variable allows us 
to test statistically whether the IV is valid under the assumption that the other IV is 
uncorrelated with the error term (overidentification test). The test is passed in all 
specifications, which suggests that the excluded instruments are indeed exogenous. 
Robustness checks. Another candidate for an excluded IV is the share of banks in a 
firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks that have subsidiaries or branches in the United States, 
where the financial crisis originated. These banks are likely to be exposed to the financial 
crisis through their U.S. affiliates. Again, we acknowledge the initial choice of such a bank as 
a relationship bank as potentially nonrandom and thus include their share in the vector of 
time-invariant controls wit whenever we use the additional IV. The IV is an interaction of this 
share with a year dummy for 2008, the climax of the banking crisis in the United States 
(Lehman Brothers collapsed in fall 2008). Unfortunately, our bank data only provide 
information on affiliates for 2012; we assume that a bank’s structure of affiliates in earlier 
years corresponds with that observed in 2012, which implies some measurement error. 
                                                 
35 The affected Federal State Banks are Bayern LB, Sachsen LB (acquired by Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 
in 2008), and West LB (Puri et al. 2011). 
36 In robustness checks, we interact a firm’s share of savings banks in 2006 affected by the financial crisis with a 
time dummy for 2008 only, when the affected savings banks were most strongly hit by the crisis. 
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Because of this data limitation, we use this third IV in additional robustness checks only. 
Another robustness check exploits membership to Eurex Exchange as an indicator for active 
presence in securities markets (cf. Abbassi et al. 2015). The overidentification test is still 
passed with the additional instruments, and the estimation results (reported in Appendix C.1) 
remain very similar. 
5 Effect of relationship banks’ credit supply on firm borrowing 
Elasticity of firm liabilities. Table 4 reports the results from estimating eq. (2) when we use 
the amount of a firm’s liabilities as the outcome yit. In column (1), the coefficient 1 of the 
contemporaneous credit supply from a firm’s relationship banks is positive, but small and 
insignificant, whereas the coefficient of the first time lag 2 is much larger and significant at 
the 1% level. This indicates that the credit supply of relationship banks indeed propagates to 
the liabilities of their business customers, but with a time lag.37 Because we empirically detect 
this lag structure in column (1), in the following regressions, we omit the insignificant 
contemporaneous growth rate of credit supply and concentrate on 2. Interpreting 2 as the 
elasticity in eq. (1), we find that the elasticity of the firm’s liabilities with respect to the credit 
supply of its banking partners in column (2) is 0.109 and significant at the 1% level. Thus, if a 
firm’s relationship banks contract credit supply by 1%, this causes the firm’s liabilities to 
decrease by about 0.1%. This indicates that firms’ borrowing is affected by the lending policy 
of their relationship banks and that firms cannot fully substitute credit from other banks for 
credit from their relationship banks. As a robustness check we include lagged sales (in first 
differences) as an additional control variable (column (3)) and find our estimated elasticity 
virtually unchanged. Because sales are observed only in the subsample of firms that report 
income statements, the sample size drops significantly in this estimation (N = 88,153 instead 
of N = 291,079). 
The results for bank lending and firm borrowing imply that firm–bank lending 
relationships are a relevant determinant of firms’ access to external capital. We thereby 
contribute to a nascent literature on the role of relationship banking for the transmission of 
monetary shocks (Hachem 2011; Bolton et al. 2013) and to the scant empirical literature 
examining relationship banking (for the United States, cf. Petersen and Rajan 1994; for 
Germany, cf. Harhoff and Körting 1998). 
                                                 
37 The time lag is probably due to the time lag between the date of negotiation and agreement about a bank loan 
and the date when the loan is actually paid out. While the bank loan appears on a bank’s balance sheet 
immediately after agreement (loan commitment), it only shows up on the firm’s balance sheet once the loan is 
paid out. 
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Table 4: Credit Supply from Relationship Banks Affects Firm Liabilities 
2SLS regressions of firms’ liability growth rates on credit supply growth rates of their banking 
partners 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit supply,  
growth rate (i) 
0.029      
(0.031)      
L.Credit supply,  
growth rate (ii) 
0.141*** 0.109*** 0.106**    
(0.040) (0.035) (0.048)    
Long-term credit supply, 
growth rate (i) 
   0.069   
   (0.114)   
L.Long-term credit supply, 
growth rate (ii) 
   0.389*** 0.322*** 0.303** 
   (0.103) (0.105) (0.143) 
D.Business tax rate 0.222 0.202 0.746* 0.243 0.206 0.726 
 (0.248) (0.247) (0.449) (0.255) (0.247) (0.450) 
L.D.Business tax rate -0.048 -0.045 0.076 0.080 0.049 0.190 
 (0.279) (0.278) (0.398) (0.284) (0.285) (0.411) 
L.D.Sales   0.136***   0.137*** 
   (0.008)   (0.008) 
Share of savings banks 
affected by the crises 
0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Number of observations 291,079 291,079 88,153 291,079 291,079 88,153 
Shea’s partial R2 for (i) 0.08   0.01   
1st stage F-statistic for (i) 107.14   171.77   
Partial Shea’s R2 for (ii) 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 
1st stage F-statistic for (ii) 233.68 333.81 376.00 309.04 185.53 277.48 
Hansen test: p-value 0.40 0.89 0.22 0.51 0.62 0.17 
Excluded instruments IV set 1 IV set 2 IV set 2 IV set 1 IV set 2 IV set 2 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. The 
dependent variable is the firm-specific growth rate in liabilities. The growth rates are log approximations. The 
growth rate of (long-term) credit supply and the share of savings banks affected by the financial crisis pertain 
to the firm’s relationship bank(s). We link firms to their banking partners via information on individual firm–
bank relationships. If a firm has multiple relationship banks, we calculate the mean of the (long-term) growth 
rates of their credit supply. D. indicates the first time difference of a variable, and L. indicates lagged values. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at 
the 1%/5%/10% levels. The (long-term) growth rate of credit supply and its first time lag (L.) are treated as 
endogenous. In the different specifications, we use alternative sets of excluded instruments: 
IV set 1: Proprietary trading gains and the share of savings banks affected by the crisis in 2007 and onward 
among a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. Contemporaneous and lagged variables. 
IV set 2: Same as IV set 1, but with lagged variables only. 
Robustness checks on the choice of instruments are provided in Table C1 of Appendix C. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial 
accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences also use 2005 (2004). 
 
Long-term credit supply. In columns (4) to (6) we repeat the estimations from columns 
(1) to (3) with long-term bank loans as the dependent variable. Long-term bank loans are 
defined as loans with a term of at least five years. Our results are qualitatively similar but the 
estimated elasticities are larger in size. The estimated elasticity of firm liabilities with respect 
to the amount of long-term credit supplied by relationship banks is 0.322 (column (5)). This is 
almost three times the size of the estimate we obtain for overall credit supply in column (2). 
Our results show that firm borrowing is, first and foremost, sensitive to the amount of long-
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term credit that banking partners supply; short-term credit seems to be available more easily 
from other banks. Because real investment by firms relies primarily on long-term loans, these 
results already suggest that investment may react sensitively to the credit supply from 
relationship banks. We assess this directly in the following section. Before doing so, we 
briefly comment on the size of the estimated effect as well as on its validity and robustness. 
Effect size. To shed further light on the size of the economic effect, we use a back-of-
the-envelope calculation to quantify the impact of losses from proprietary trading during the 
U.S. financial crisis on firm borrowing. The average loss from proprietary trading of the 
banks in our sample between 2007 and 2008, normalized by financial assets, is -1.21 
percentage points (from 0.069% down to -1.137%). Inserting this in the first-stage equation 
for long-term credit supply (Table A3 in Appendix A), we obtain -0.0121  0.832 = -0.01. 
Thus, the financial crisis decreased the mean growth rate of long-term credit supply by one 
percentage point—in other words, more than half the mean growth rate in the sample of 1.8% 
(see Table 3). We insert this in the second-stage equation in column (5) of Table 4 and obtain 
-0.01  0.322 = -0.0032. Thus, through losses from banks’ proprietary trading, the financial 
crisis caused a decrease of the growth rate in firm liabilities by 0.32 percentage points, or 54% 
of the mean growth rate in liabilities, equal to 0.6% in the sample (cf. Table 2). We obtain a 
similar relative effect size of 55% when we repeat these calculations using total credit supply 
instead of long-term credit supply. The average reduction of the growth of firm borrowing by 
more than half indicates that the estimated effects are economically significant. 
First-stage results. To assess the relevance of our instruments, we report first-stage 
results from the 2SLS estimations in Table A3 of the Appendix. Larger gains from proprietary 
trading increase the volume of credits, while banks that incur losses from trading activities 
due to the financial crisis reduce their lending volume. The predominant mechanism is thus 
the impact of the financial crisis on bank health, rather than investment opportunities in fire 
sales.38 Our instruments are strong, as indicated by the first-stage statistics, which appear at 
the bottom of Table 4. The F-statistic of a test of exclusion of the two instruments from the 
first-stage estimation is well above 100 in all specifications. Because, in the case of two 
endogenous variables (columns (1) of Table 4), the first-stage F-statistic may not be sufficient 
to show the strength of the instruments, we also inspect Shea’s partial R2, which is sufficiently 
large. Furthermore, the null hypothesis of Hansen’s overidentification test cannot be rejected 
                                                 
38 The interaction of the variable “share of savings banks affected” with the dummy variable indicating the 
period of financial crisis, in and after 2007, has a negative and significant coefficient. This is consistent with 
reduced lending by savings banks in Germany that were affected by the U.S. financial crisis through their 
holdings of distressed Federal State Banks, after the onset of the financial crisis. 
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in any of the estimations (see p-values in Table 4). Thus, under the assumption of exogeneity 
of one excluded IV, the other excluded instruments are also exogenous. 
Robustness checks. We subject our estimation results to several robustness checks, 
which are reported in Appendix C. Our results prove to be very robust to the choice of 
instruments, to specification choices, to the use of the maximal growth rate of credit supply 
instead of the average growth rate of credit supply, and to the exclusion of specific firms and 
banks (i.e., firms with financial institutions among their owners and subsidiaries of foreign 
banks or real estate banks). 
We therefore conclude that relationship banking is important in Germany and that a 
firm’s access to borrowed capital heavily depends on the credit supply of its banking 
partner(s)−in particular with respect to long-term loans with a term of at least five years. This 
opens up the possibility of bank loan supply affecting the real economy through firms’ 
investment and employment decisions, which we study next.  
6 Effects on the real economy: investment and employment 
6.1 Investment 
Table 5 presents our results from estimating the investment equation, i.e., eq. (2) when we use 
a firm’s capital stock as yit. Note that we employ the same set of instruments and explanatory 
variables as in the previous section, so the first-stage regression is identical. For a discussion 
of instrument relevance, refer to Section 5 and Table A3 in the Appendix. 
In the previous section we found that bank loan supply matters for firm borrowing but 
with a time lag. Therefore we again use the lagged growth rate of credit supplied by a firm’s 
relationship banks as the main explanatory variable. The estimated elasticity of a firm’s stock 
of fixed assets with respect to the credit supplied by its banking partners is 0.073 and 
significant at the 1% level. Controlling for sales (in first differences) as a measure of firm size 
again reduces our sample size but leaves the point estimate of the elasticity of the stock of 
fixed assets unchanged (0.077, statistical significance at the 5% level, column (2)). 
When we use long-term credit supply (column (3)) instead of total credit supply, we 
obtain much larger estimates for the elasticity of a firm’s stock of fixed assets (point estimate 
of 0.211), in line with our finding for a firm’s liabilities. This confirms that firm investment is 
much more sensitive to long-term credit supply from relationship banks than to their general 
credit supply, which is also what we would expect given that real investment relies primarily 
on long-term funds. 
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Table 5: Credit Supply Determines Firms’ Real Investment and Employment 
2SLS regressions of investment and employment growth rates on credit supply growth rates of 
their banking partners 
Dependent variable Fixed assets, growth rate Employment, growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L.Credit supply, growth 
rate 
0.073*** 0.077**  0.051** 0.035  
(0.027) (0.038)  (0.025) (0.029)  
L.Long-term credit supply, 
growth rate 
  0.211***   0.152** 
  (0.081)   (0.074) 
D.Business tax rate -0.371* -0.640* -0.368* -0.241 0.140 -0.261 
 (0.217) (0.377) (0.217) (0.256) (0.372) (0.257) 
L.D.Business tax rate -0.586** -0.777** -0.527** 0.173 0.362 0.229 
 (0.239) (0.343) (0.245) (0.266) (0.339) (0.271) 
L.D.Sales  0.116***   0.108***  
  (0.006)   (0.010)  
Share of savings banks 
affected by the crisis 
0.005* 0.011** 0.004* 0.010*** 0.012** 0.010*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.000 0.009** 0.002 0.005 -0.004 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Number of observations 291,079 88,153 291,079 36,843 18,910 36,843 
Shea’s partial R2 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.02 
1st stage F-statistic 333.81 376.00 185.53 216.04 85.01 123.78 
Hansen test: p-value 0.60 0.34 0.43 0.50 0.51 0.50 
Excluded instruments IV set 2 IV set 2 IV set 2 IV set 2 IV set 2 IV set 2 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. The 
dependent variable is the firm-specific growth rate in fixed assets (columns (1) to (3)) and the growth rate in 
the number of employees (columns (4) to (6)), respectively. The growth rates are log approximations. The 
growth rate of (long-term) credit supply and the share of savings banks affected by the crisis pertain to the 
firm’s relationship bank(s). We link firms to their banking partners via information on individual firm–bank 
relationships. If a firm has multiple relationship banks, we calculate the mean of the (long-term) growth rates 
of their credit supply. D. indicates the first time difference of a variable, and L. indicates lagged values. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at 
the 1%/5%/10% levels. The (long-term) growth rate of credit supply is treated as endogenous. We use the 
following set of excluded instruments: 
IV set 2: Lagged proprietary trading gains and lagged share of savings banks affected by the crisis in 2007 and 
onward among a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. 
Robustness checks on the choice of instruments are provided in Table C1 of Appendix C. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial 
accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences also use 2005 (2004). 
 
Effect size. Our results show that the capital stock of firms shrinks if relationship banks 
reduce their credit supply. On average, a decrease in firms’ external liabilities by one euro due 
to reduced credit supply from relationship banks leads to a reduction of 0.3 euros in the 
capital stock of firms.39 In the following, we approximate the effect of bank losses from 
proprietary trading during the U.S. financial crisis on the net real investment rate of 
nonfinancial firms. In Section 5, we showed that the growth rate of long-term credit supply 
decreased by one percentage point due to these bank losses (based on the first-stage results). 
                                                 
39 We obtain this result with the following calculation. Using the estimated elasticities and average values for 
liabilities and fixed assets from Table 2, a decrease in credit supply by 10% leads to a reduction in average firm 
liabilities by 0.0109 * 4,797,000 = 52,287 euros and a reduction in average firms’ fixed assets by 0.0073 * 
2,183,000 = 15,936 euros, which is 30% of the reduction in liabilities. 
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We insert this in the second-stage equation in column (3) of Table 5 and obtain -0.01  0.211 
= -0.0021. This indicates that proprietary trading losses of relationship banks caused a 
decrease in the net real investment rate of their business clients by 0.21 percentage points or 
19% of the mean net real investment rate in the sample of 1.1% (cf. Table 2). We obtain a 
similar estimate of 20% when we use total credit supply instead of long-term credit supply in 
the calculation. Thus, the economic effect of the financial crisis on real investment through 
distressed relationship banks is economically significant. 
Robustness checks. We run several robustness checks to probe the robustness of our 
results concerning choice of instruments, of specification and of sample selection. The results 
are again reported in Appendix C. We find that the point estimates in the robustness checks 
are similar to our baseline estimates (both for overall credit supply and for long-term credit 
supply), which indicates that the results are robust. 
6.2 Employment  
Our finding that firms significantly reduce real investment when credit supply from their 
relationship banks decreases raises another question: Do firms also reduce employment as the 
second major input factor of production? This is what we expect if capital and labor are 
complements. To answer this question, we re-estimate eq. (2), but with the number of 
employees as yit. The results are provided in Table 5, columns (4) to (6). We find a positive 
effect of credit supply on the number of employees in Germany, which is line with earlier 
findings for the U.S. (Chodorow-Reich 2014). The estimated elasticity in our baseline 
specification in column (4) is 0.051, significant at the 5% level. The coefficients in the 
employment equation are less precisely estimated because the sample, for which information 
on the number of employees is available, is considerably smaller than our baseline sample 
(N=36,843 instead of N=291,079), in particular when we additionally control for sales 
(N=18,910 column (5), point estimate: 0.035, p-value: 0.21).40 Again we see that the 
coefficient of interest increases if long-term credit supply is used as an explanatory variable 
instead of overall credit supply (column (6)). Comparing the employment elasticity to the 
investment elasticity shows that employment is less elastic. This is a reasonable result for 
Germany, where subsidized short-time work agreements (Kurzarbeit) buffer employment in 
                                                 
40 The coefficients we obtain from estimating the investment equation on this restricted sample are somewhat 
larger than the ones we report in Table 5, columns (1) to (3). The coefficient for Table 5, specification (1) 
estimated for the restricted sample is 0.171 (standard error: 0.051), significant at the 1% level. Full results are 
available upon request. 
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economic downturns (see Hijzen and Venn 2011) and where labor legislation puts tight 
restrictions on short-term firing policies. 
Robustness checks. We run the same robustness checks as for investment and again find 
the point estimates to be statistically indistinguishable from our baseline estimates (both for 
overall credit supply and for long-term credit supply). The results are reported in Appendix C. 
6.3 Effect heterogeneity 
Next, we explore whether investment by certain types of firms is more or less sensitive to 
changes in credit supply from their relationship banks.41 For example, smaller, younger firms 
may be more likely to suffer from information asymmetries in the capital market (e.g. 
Hadlock and Pierce 2010). Thus, for these firms it might be more difficult to obtain external 
credit. On the other hand, these firms are also more likely to accumulate financial slack 
because they anticipate experiencing financial constraints (Almeida et al. 2004). 
In Table 6, columns (1) and (2), we follow prior literature on financial constraints (e.g., 
Almeida and Campello 2007) and split the sample by the ratio of fixed assets over total assets 
(tangibility). Firms with a higher share of tangible assets can provide more collateral and may 
find it easier to obtain loans from banks they did not have a lending relationship with in the 
past. Therefore, we expect investment of firms with higher tangibility to be less sensitive to 
changes in credit supply from their existing relationship banks. This is also what we find in 
the data: The elasticity is large and significant at the 1% level for firms with tangibility below 
the median (point estimate: 0.120, column (1)) but small and insignificant for those above the 
median (point estimate: 0.039, column (2)).42 
Our large and comprehensive micro data base includes many small and medium-sized 
firms; while mean total assets are 10,876,000 euros, the first quartile stands at 254,000 euros 
only and the median at 604,000 euros (cf. Table 2). Small firms suffer more from information 
asymmetries in the capital market (because of weaker publication requirements, cf. Hadlock 
and Pierce 2010). If they are also less able to use alternative sources of financing, then we 
expect smaller firms to be more credit sensitive in their investment decision. Although this is 
what the relative sizes of our estimated coefficients suggest (columns (3) and (4)), the 
difference between the two point estimates is small and not statistically significant. The result 
                                                 
41 Due to the relatively small size of our employment sample, we do not analyze heterogeneous effects with 
respect to employment. 
42 The differences in the investment sensitivity of firms with low and high tangibility are not driven by industry 
characteristics. If we only use firms in the manufacturing sector, results are unchanged but are less precisely 
estimated. Furthermore, results are unchanged when comparing firms with a share of tangible assets in the lowest 
third of the distribution to firms with a share of tangible assets in the highest third of the distribution. The same is 
true for firm size. 
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suggests that both firm types are able to compensate reductions in the credit supply to a 
similar extent.43 This is in line with Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (forthcoming), who classify 
firms as financially constrained (or unconstrained) based on five measures commonly used in the 
literature, and who find that the firms classified as financially constrained do not behave as if they 
were constrained. 
Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects by Firm Types 
2SLS regressions of firms’ fixed assets growth rates on loan growth rates of their banks 









 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
L.Credit supply, growth rate 0.120*** 0.039  0.092** 0.067** 
(0.039) (0.038)  (0.046) (0.033) 
D.Business tax rate -0.534 -0.533*  -0.467 -0.271 
(0.337) (0.278)  (0.326) (0.287) 
L.D.Business tax rate -0.726* -0.562*  -0.280 -0.854*** 
(0.386) (0.290)  (0.366) (0.310) 
Share of savings banks affected 0.007* 0.001  0.002 0.012*** 
(0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant 0.014*** -0.015***  -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Number of observations 145,510 145,929  144,554 146,525 
Shea’s partial R2 0.08 0.06  0.06 0.08 
1st stage F-statistic 415.23 128.86  135.83 423.74 
Hansen test: p-value 0.79 0.72  0.80 0.92 
Excluded IV IV set 2 IV set 2  IV set 2 IV set 2 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. The 
dependent variable is the firm-specific growth rate in fixed assets. The growth rates are log approximations. The 
growth rate of credit supply and the share of savings banks affected by the crisis pertain to the firm’s relationship 
bank(s). We link firms to their banking partners via information on individual firm–bank relationships. If a firm 
has multiple relationship banks, we calculate the mean of the bank variables for each firm-year observation. D. 
indicates the first time difference of a variable, and L. indicates lagged values. “Above the median” is short for 
weakly above the median here. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and reported in parentheses. 
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. The growth rate of credit supply is treated as 
endogenous. We use the following set of excluded instruments: 
IV set 2: Lagged proprietary trading gains and lagged share of savings banks affected by the crisis in 2007 and 
onward among a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial 
accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences also use 2005 (2004). 
 
7 Adjustment channels 
In the previous sections, we provide evidence that firm borrowing, investment and 
employment react significantly to changes in credit supplied by their relationship banks. 
                                                 
43 A related dimension of heterogeneity is firm age. Information asymmetries are usually found to be more severe 
for younger firms (with less track record), which may therefore be more dependent on relationship banks. 
Splitting the sample at the median age of firms (14 years) or, alternatively, at age 6, indeed yields larger point 
estimates of the investment elasticity for younger firms than for older firms. But again the difference is small and 
not statistically significant (results available upon request). 
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Further, we find evidence for differences in the investment response of firm types to changes 
in credit supply by relationship banks, which suggests that firms are in the position to partly 
compensate a contraction in loan supply, and that the ability to do so varies between firms. In 
the following, we focus on two major adjustment channels: first, a change in banking partners, 
and second, substitution of external debt financing with self-financing by means of using 
accumulated cash holdings, reducing dividend payments, or issuing new equity.44 
7.1 Change of banking partners 
We start out by analyzing the role of new bank relationships. We do so by estimating eq. (2) 
with different dependent variables. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, we use a dummy 
variable as the dependent variable, which is one if a change in the set of banking partners 
occurs while the number of banking partners remains constant and zero otherwise.45 We 
expect the likelihood of a change in the set of banking partners to be a function of the initial 
number of banking partners. We therefore include dummy variables to control for the number 
of banking partners in 2006, before the crisis (baseline category: one banking partner in 
2006). The point estimate of interest of -0.024 (column (1)) indicates that the probability of 
switching a banking partner increases by 0.24 percentage points or 8 percent (evaluated at the 
baseline probability of 3 percent) when the growth rate of credit supply from the prior 
relationship banks decreases by 10 percent. 
In columns (3) and (4), we use the change in the number of banking partners as the 
dependent variable. We again use dummy variables to control for the initial number of 
banking partners (in pre-crisis year 2006). Estimation results in column (3) show that the 
average number of banking partners significantly grows by 0.004 when prior relationship 
banks contract their lending by 10%. This is economically significant, given that the average 
change in banking partners is -0.002. 
                                                 
44 Becker and Ivashina (2014) report that firms in the USA switch from loans to corporate bonds at times of 
depressed lending or poor bank performance. However, our data confirm that in Germany as a bank-based 
economy, issuing bonds is a negligible source of financing in the nonfinancial sector. 
45 In Table 7, as the key explanatory variable, we use the contemporaneous growth rate in the credit supply of the 
relationship banks instead of the first time lag because a new lending relationship is already established at the 
time of the credit negotiations. 
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Table 7: Change of Banking Partners 
2SLS regressions 
Dependent variable Change of  
banking partners 
Change in the number 
of banking partners 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit supply, growth rate -0.024*  -0.040**  
(0.015)  (0.016)  
Share of banks with proprietary trading losses  0.005*  0.008** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
D.Business tax rate -0.364*** -0.368*** -0.311** -0.318** 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.126) (0.126) 
L.D.Business tax rate -0.283*** -0.359*** 0.223* 0.099 
 (0.109) (0.106) (0.134) (0.131) 
Two banking partners in 2006 0.016*** 0.016*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Three banking partners in 2006 0.034*** 0.034*** -0.073*** -0.074*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Four banking partners in 2006 0.047*** 0.046*** -0.160*** -0.161*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017) 
Five banking partners in 2006 0.057*** 0.056*** -0.350*** -0.351*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.051) (0.051) 
Six banking partners in 2006 0.093*** 0.092*** -0.522*** -0.522*** 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.123) (0.123) 
Share of savings banks affected by the crisis -0.010*** -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.037*** 0.037*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of observations 158,760 158,760 158,760 158,760 
Shea’s partial R2 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.04 
1st stage F-statistic 37.92 115.31 37.92 115.27 
Hansen test: p-value 0.59 0.61 0.77 0.81 
Excluded instruments IV set 5 IV set 5 IV set 5 IV set 5 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. 
“Change of banking partners” refers to a dummy variable which is one if a change in the set of banking 
partners occurs while the number of banking partners remains constant and zero otherwise. D. indicates 
the first time difference of a variable, and L. indicates lagged values. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
The growth rate of credit supply and the share of banking partners with proprietary trading losses are 
treated as endogenous. We use the following set of excluded instruments:  
IV set 5: Proprietary trading gains and share of savings banks affected by the crisis in 2007 and onward 
among a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank 
financial accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences also use 2005 (2004). 
 
We take a different approach in columns (2) and (4). Instead of the growth rate of credit 
supply from the relationship banks, we use the share of banks with losses from proprietary 
trading in a firm’s current set of banking partners as the main explanatory variable of interest. 
This variable is a direct indicator of exposure of a firm to the financial crisis through its 
relationship banks. Because the current share of relationship banks with trading losses is 
endogenous due to potential changes in the set of relationship banks, we again run a 2SLS 
estimation. The excluded IV is the same as in the baseline specification and thus holds a 
firm’s set of relationship banks in 2006 constant. We find that the higher the current share of 
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banking partners with trading losses, the more likely the firm is to adjust its set of banking 
partners (column (2)) and to increase its number of banking partners (column (4)). If all 
relationship banks of a firm incur proprietary trading losses, the probability of switching a 
relationship bank increases by 0.5 percentage points or 17 percent. 
In summary, the results from columns (1)–(4) provide evidence that, on average, firms 
whose relationship banks were exposed to the U.S. financial crisis were able to partly balance 
a contraction in credit supply by changing their banking partners or by finding additional 
ones. While Abbassi et al. (2015) report that their findings for Germany indirectly “suggest 
that firms cannot compensate for the reduction in credit by trading banks with credit from 
other banks” (p. 5-6), we provide evidence that firms react by establishing new bank 
relationships. 
However, we expect these average effects to hide considerable differences at the firm 
level since firms widely differ in their ability to open up new bank relationships. In Table 8, 
we break down the pooled effect and consider the following two dimensions: tangibility and 
firm size. We expect firms to more easily find new banking partners the higher their share of 
tangible assets to be pledged (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990; Rajan and Zingales 1995). 
Columns (1) and (2) show the effects for firms with a share of tangible assets above and 
below the median, respectively. We find that the pooled effect in Table 7 (column (2)) is 
entirely driven by firms with a share of tangible assets above the median (point estimate: 
0.012, significant at the 1% level). In the group of firms with low tangibility, by contrast, we 
do not find any evidence for their number of banking partners to change in response to banks’ 
proprietary trading losses (point estimate: 0.003, p-value: 0.77). 
In columns (3) to (5) we consider firm size. Due to stricter publication requirements for 
large firms (and thus smaller information asymmetries between firm and bank, cf. Harris and 
Raviv 1990; Rajan and Zingales 1995), we expect these firms to more easily establish new 
bank relationships than small firms. This implies that large (but not small) firms have the 
ability to increase their number of banking partners in order to compensate for a decline in 
credit supplied from long-standing banking partners. Again splitting the sample at the median, 
we find a point estimate for large firms of 0.009, which is similar to the pooled effect in  
Table 7 (column (2)), while the point estimate for small firms is very small (0.002,  
column (5)) and statistically insignificant (p-value: 0.65).46 To assess whether the large-firm 
effect might in reality be a listed-firm effect we re-estimate the equation for large firms and 
                                                 
46 Because of the comparably small sample that can be used for these estimations, standard errors are fairly large. 
Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis of zero difference between the two estimates. 
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include an interaction term between the share of affected banks (with proprietary trading 
losses) and a dummy variable indicating publicly listed firms. We see that publicly listed 
firms indeed have a larger probability of increasing the number of banking partners if needed. 
This might be part of the story why it is attractive for some firms to accept strict publication 
requirements and publication costs and become publicly listed. The baseline effect for large 
firms, however, does not decrease (column (4)) and is thus not driven by listed firms. 
Table 8: Change in Number of Banking Partners Depends on Tangibility & Firm Size 
2SLS regressions, dependent variable: change in no. of banking partners 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share of banks with  
proprietary trading losses (i) 
0.012*** 0.003 0.009* 0.009* 0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Share of banks with prop. trading losses x 
indicator for publicly listed firms (ii) 
   0.122*  
   (0.062)  
D.Business tax rate -0.393** -0.270 -0.121 -0.134 -0.505*** 
 (0.182) (0.174) (0.216) (0.216) (0.131) 
L.D.Business tax rate 0.040 0.156 0.101 -0.071 0.296** 
 (0.192) (0.178) (0.230) (0.223) (0.132) 
Two banking partners in 2006 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Three banking partners in 2006 -0.078*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.075*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
Four banking partners in 2006 -0.158*** -0.164*** -0.166*** -0.167*** -0.152*** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.056) 
Five banking partners in 2006 -0.341*** -0.363*** -0.346*** -0.350*** -0.709** 
(0.067) (0.079) (0.052) (0.052) (0.318) 
Six banking partners in 2006 -0.643*** -0.294** -0.527*** -0.529*** . 
(0.170) (0.144) (0.122) (0.122) . 
Share of savings banks affected by the 
crisis 
0.007*** 0.004** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.009 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Number of observations 79,779 78,891 79,713 79,713 79,047 
Shea’s partial R2 for (i) 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 
1st stage F-statistic for (i) 36.26 304.47 65.70 69.63 698.05 
Shea’s partial R2 for (ii)    0.03  
1st stage F-statistic for (ii)    54.87  
Hansen test: p-value 0.51 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.49 
Excluded instruments IV set 5 IV set 5 IV set 5 IV set 6 IV set 5 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. D. 
indicates the first time difference of a variable, and L. indicates lagged values. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. The share 
of banking partners with proprietary trading losses is treated as endogenous. In the different specifications, we 
use the following sets of excluded instruments: 
IV set 5: Proprietary trading gains and share of savings banks affected by the crisis in 2007 and onward among a 
firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. 
IV set 6: Same as IV set 5, additionally including the interaction term between the indicator for publicly listed 
firms and the proprietary trading gains among a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial 
accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences also use 2005 (2004). 
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Robustness checks. As a robustness check we re-estimate the estimations from Table 8 
with the change in credit supply as the main explanatory variable instead of the share of banks 
with proprietary trading losses (again using 2SLS regressions). Qualitatively, the results are 
the same and are reported in Table C3 in Appendix C. 
In a nutshell, we observe pronounced heterogeneity in the likelihood of firms to change 
their number of banking partners. In particular, large firms and firms with a large share of 
tangible assets respond to contractions in loan supply by establishing new bank relationships. 
7.2 Substitution of external debt with other sources of financing 
Besides establishing new bank relationships to obtain external debt from a different outside 
creditor, firms can substitute external debt with other sources of financing. Essentially, there 
are three alternatives to debt financing: using funds initially designated for dividend 
payments, issuing new equity, or using free, accumulated cash. In the following, we exploit an 
important feature of our data set: that we can observe all of these balance sheet variables for 
most of the firms in our sample. If firms substitute external debt with funds from these 
alternative sources of financing, this substitution should be causally affected by credit supply 
by relationship banks. We therefore re-estimate eq. (2) with dividend payments, nominal 
capital, and cash, respectively, as outcome variables yit. 
Table 9 presents the results. We start with assessing the impact of credit supply on firms’ 
dividend payments. Parts of the literature use dividend payments as an indicator of financially 
unconstrained firms. The underlying argument is that these firms can easily increase their 
internal funds by cutting dividends. Our results provide support for this rational. Column (1) 
shows that credit supply has a positive, causal effect on dividend payments (point estimate: 
0.396, significant at the 5% level). In the context of the present paper this implies that a 10% 
reduction in credit supply by a firm’s relationship bank(s) leads to a cut in dividends of about 
4%. Next, we consider issuance of new equity as measured by the growth rate in nominal 
capital. On average, credit supply has a negative impact on nominal capital (column (2)). 
Firms thus compensate for part of the contraction in loans supplied by their banking partners 
by issuing new equity. 
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Table 9: Adjustment Channels of Firms 
2SLS regressions 
Dependent variable Dividends, 
growth rate 
 Nominal capital,  
growth rate 
 Cash,  
growth rate 
 Full sample  Full sample  Without dividend payments   Full sample  Without dividend payments  
      Tangibility < 
median 
Firm size < 
median 
    Tangibility < 
median 
Firm size < 
median 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
L.Credit supply, 
growth rate 
0.396**  -0.019*  -0.028** -0.035** -0.006  0.159**  0.186** 0.057 0.355** 
(0.158)  (0.011)  (0.013) (0.017) (0.011)  (0.071)  (0.084) (0.097) (0.142) 
D.Business tax rate 1.034  0.103  0.131 0.152 -0.055  -0.271  -0.366 -1.262 0.894 
 (1.013)  (0.084)  (0.093) (0.151) (0.084)  (0.479)  (0.544) (0.778) (0.741) 
L.D.Business tax rate -0.314  0.017  -0.023 0.001 0.245**  -1.355**  -1.052* -2.043** -1.955** 
 (1.159)  (0.109)  (0.126) (0.166) (0.103)  (0.555)  (0.635) (0.897) (0.885) 
Share of savings banks 
affected by the crisis 
0.010  -0.002***  -0.002* -0.004*** -0.002**  0.001  0.005 0.001 0.002 
(0.010)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.057***  -0.015***  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.026***  0.033***  0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.014)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
Number of obs. 220,830  288,414  232,311 113,881 126,288  243,278  192,776 95,971 101,738 
Shea’s partial R2 0.07  0.07  0.07 0.08 0.06  0.07  0.06 0.08 0.05 
1st stage F-statistic 240.79  329.47  246.83 313.80 116.54  281.64  211.42 277.60 105.87 
Hansen test: p-value 0.37  0.32  0.23 0.38 0.06  0.99  0.65 0.27 0.90 
Excluded IVs IV set 2  IV set 2  IV set 2 IV set 2 IV set 2  IV set 2  IV set 2 IV set 2 IV set 2 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. The growth rate of credit supply and the share of savings banks affected by 
the crisis pertain to the firm’s relationship bank(s). We link firms to their banking partners via information on individual firm–bank relationships. If a firm has multiple 
relationship banks, we calculate the mean of the bank variables for each firm-year observation. D. indicates the first time difference of a variable, and L. indicates lagged values. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. The number of observations is smaller in 
some columns because of missing data and because the dependent variables are zero (before taking logs) for some firm-year observations. For the calculation of the growth rate in 
dividends, we added 1 before taking logs as otherwise only dividend paying firms would be in our sample. In specifications (6) to (9), we exclude firms with a growth rate of cash 
in the top and bottom 3% of the distribution. Although the point estimates are not affected by the censoring, the estimates are more precisely estimated. The growth rate of credit 
supply and the share of banking partners with proprietary trading losses are treated as endogenous. We use the following set of excluded instruments: 
IV set 2: Lagged proprietary trading gains and lagged share of savings banks affected by the crisis in 2007 and onward among a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences 
also use 2005 (2004). 
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The pecking order theory suggests that new equity is the most expensive source of 
financing. We therefore expect firms able to compensate a reduction in credit supply by using 
other (less costly) sources of funds to be less likely to issue new equity, compared to those 
that cannot resort to other sources. Column (3) provides evidence for this presumption. We 
find a stronger reaction of nominal capital for the subsample of firms which are unable to 
increase internal funds by cutting dividends because they do not pay out any (we use dividend 
payment in 2007 as the splitting criterion). Among these firms, those with low asset 
tangibility even more resort to external equity, because their lack of collateral makes it hard to 
obtain credit from new banking partners (column (4)). Furthermore, smaller non-dividend-
paying firms are less likely to issue new equity than larger ones (column (5)). This finding is 
in line with the argument that large firms have better access to the equity market. 
Last, we test whether firms use accumulated cash to mitigate a reduction in credit supply. 
For this analysis we use the growth rate of cash (held in the form of liquid bank deposits)47 as 
dependent variable. As shown by Almeida et al. (2004) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), firms 
that are financially constrained are more likely to accumulate cash in high cash flow times. 
We expect these firms to use the accumulated cash to mitigate the reduction in credit supply. 
The average elasticity of cash with respect to the credit supply from the relationship banks is 
0.159 (significant at the 10% level, column (6)). 
Column (7) shows that accumulated cash of firms which do not pay dividends reacts 
more sensitively to a change in credit supply, in line with our expectations. Among these 
firms, we assess differences with respect to the tangibility of a firm’s assets (column (8)). Our 
estimations suggest that firms with low asset tangibility are less likely to use accumulated 
cash to mitigate shocks to the firms’ credit supply than the average non-dividend-paying firm. 
This result is consistent with our previous finding that firms with asset tangibility below the 
median exhibit high investment sensitivity with respect to bank loan supply (see Table 6, 
column (1)), while firms with high tangibility show little investment sensitivity (see Table 6, 
column (2)). However, this result raises the question why firms with low asset tangibility do 
not use accumulated cash to mitigate reductions in credit supply−in particular as these firms 
should be more likely to hold cash for precautionary saving motives (Almeida et al. 2004). 
Uncertainty about future credit supply could be a potential explanation: If such financially 
constrained firms expect the change in credit supply to be more permanent, they probably are 
reluctant to quickly use up their cash reserves. In column (9) we focus on small non-dividend-
                                                 
47 We do not include marketable securities because their value might have been affected by the financial crisis. 
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paying firms. The point estimate increases to 0.355 (significant at the 5% level). Our results 
thus show that both large and small firms are able to partly mitigate a contraction in credit 
supply but differ in the way of doing so: Large firms cut dividends (as they are more likely to 
pay out dividends), establish new bank relationships, and issue new equity; small firms resort 
to cash accumulated for this purpose. 
We gauge the relative importance of the different adjustment channels for firms in our 
sample by calculating the average funds obtained from each channel. When relationship banks 
reduce their credit supply by 10%, firms decrease their cash holdings, on average, by 12,386 
euros (0.1  0.159  779,000 euros; cf. Table 9 and Table 2), they reduce their dividend 
payments by 11,524 euros (0.1  0.396  291,000), and they externally raise new equity 
amounting to 1372 euros (0.1  0.019  722,000). In total, the additional self-financing 
amounts to 25,282 euros on average. In comparison, liabilities are reduced by 52,287 euros on 
average (0.1  0.109  4,797,000). Thus, firms are able to mitigate 48% of the reduction in 
debt financing through additional self-financing—more specifically, by using (accumulated) 
cash (49%), reducing dividends (46%), and issuing new equity (5%).48 
8 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature on the transmission of financial shocks to the real 
economy and, more specifically, to the international propagation of financial crises through 
globalized banking. We explore these issues by exploiting a unique database in which we can 
observe a firm’s borrowing, investment and labor employment decisions together with 
information on its relationship banks. The database contains financial statements of individual 
firms and their relationship banks in Germany over the 2004–2010 period. It includes small 
and medium-sized firms, which might be hit hardest by a contraction in loan supply. Our 
analysis exploits exogenous variation in the individual exposure of banks in Germany to the 
2007–2008 U.S. financial crisis. 
We find that banks in Germany that were affected by the U.S. financial crisis reduced 
their loan supply and thus internationally propagated the crisis. German firms whose 
relationship banks became distressed during the crisis (and thus contracted their credit supply) 
reduced overall borrowing. This indicates that relationship banking is important because firms 
cannot easily substitute loans from a relationship bank with loans from other banks. 
                                                 
48 The calculation assumes that the average values of dividends, cash holdings and new equity, which we only 
observe in subsamples, are representative. 
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Furthermore, these firms significantly reduced their real investment and labor employment, 
which suggests that other sources of financing cannot fully make up for the reduction in credit 
supply. Overall, the mean net real investment rate of nonfinancial firms in Germany was 
reduced by one-fifth in 2008 due to losses from proprietary trading that their relationship 
banks suffered during the financial crisis. 
For the first time we identify how firms mitigate a causal contraction in loan supply 
based on comprehensive micro data from a developed country. We document that firms with 
more tangible assets are less dependent on their relationship banks and establish new bank 
relationships if needed. This is consistent with the view that these firms can provide more 
collateral and can, therefore, borrow from other banks more easily. We further show that the 
average firm in our sample can offset almost half of a contraction in credit supply by using 
internal funds, by reducing dividend payments, and by issuing new equity (to a smaller 
extent). 
Overall, our results show the importance of relationship lending and point to the risks of 
globalization of banking in the international transmission of monetary shocks. This is a timely 
insight given the current debate on banking regulation. One implication of our results is that a 
separation of investment banking from commercial banking could reduce the contagion risk 
from a financial crisis to a crisis of the real economy. The transmission channel analyzed here 
would be disrupted: Losses from proprietary trading would not reduce the common equity 
base of a universal bank and would not impede the ability of commercial banks to lend to 
nonfinancial firms. These considerations lend support to banking separation initiatives, such 
as the Volcker Rule in the United States and the Liikanen Report in the European Union. On 
the other hand, one can argue that universal banking facilitates the diversification of risks in 
other economic situations. 
For the economic modeling and policy management of crises, our results document the 
importance of the bank lending and firm borrowing channel in the development of a real 
economic crisis. Distress on the side of banks causally spills over to real investment and labor 
employment of nonfinancial firms. This implies that monetary and fiscal policy should aim to 
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Appendix A: Supplementary tables 
Table A1: Bank Characteristics by Bank Type 
 Trading vs. nontrading banks  Type of bank 
 Nontrading 
banks  







Explanatory variables   
 
   
Total assets in th. euros 1,236,556 19,528,038  2,286,046 563,498 11,723,731 
Credit supply in th. euros 707,082 7,018,795  1,360,294 327,167 4,236,078 
Credit supply / total assets 0.571 0.554  0.578 0.580 0.552 
Long-term credit supply in th. euros 393,176 2,735,758  867,179 200,233 1,586,756 
Long-term credit supply/total assets 0.339 0.337  0.368 0.353 0.310 
Other earning assets over total assets 0.380 0.402  0.380 0.371 0.400 
Share deposits to total assets 0.881 0.860  0.891 0.877 0.865 
Instrumental variables   
 
   
Gains from proprietary trading 15 614  221 17 229 
Type of bank   
 
   
Savings bank 0.163 0.631  1 0 0 
Local cooperative bank 0.350 0.120  0 1 0 
Other bank 0.487 0.249  0 0 1 
Bank-year observations 4977 1663 
 
1860 1941 2839 
Notes: The table shows mean bank characteristics by bank type. Banks are defined as trading banks if they have 
nonzero gains or losses from proprietary trading in 2005 and 2006. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the bank financial accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; 




Table A2: Firm Characteristics by Type of Relationship Banks 

























Total assets in th. euros 3912 18,769 11,863  4387 2515 17,700 
Capital stock in th. euros 867 4163 2220  1459 719 3296 
Capital stock, growth rate 0.010 0.023 0.007  0.015 0.018 0.012 
Total liabilities in th. euros 1797 7664 5387  1948 1146 7728 
Ratio of liabilities to total assets 0.547 0.538 0.537  0.552 0.560 0.527 
Liabilities, growth rate 0.002 0.007 0.008  0.007 0.007 0.006 




Number of banking partners 1.136 2.335 1.249  1.557 1.676 1.603 
Savings bank 0.290 0.630 0.528  1.000 0.339 0.259 
Local cooperative bank 0.327 0.395 0.069  0.138 1.000 0.085 
Other private bank 0.489 0.783 0.545  0.308 0.248 1.000 
Industries    
 
   
Agriculture, forestry 0.019 0.008 0.008  0.009 0.016 0.011 
Mining and quarrying 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 
Manufacturing 0.181 0.254 0.180  0.199 0.208 0.206 
Energy and water supply 0.006 0.009 0.006  0.007 0.005 0.008 
Construction 0.181 0.175 0.127  0.178 0.213 0.120 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.230 0.252 0.222  0.231 0.252 0.228 
Hotels and restaurants 0.027 0.013 0.032  0.027 0.022 0.023 
Transport, storage and communic. 0.054 0.047 0.051  0.050 0.050 0.051 
Financial intermediation 0.013 0.011 0.015  0.010 0.009 0.016 
Renting and business activities 0.208 0.176 0.264  0.200 0.164 0.259 
Public administration and defense 0.012 0.007 0.013  0.011 0.008 0.011 
Education 0.024 0.016 0.027  0.028 0.015 0.023 
Health and social work 0.046 0.031 0.054  0.049 0.037 0.044 
Firm-year observations 79,373 49,784 161,922 
 
139,933 56,787 165,934 
Notes: The table shows firms’ average characteristics by type of their banking partners. In the calculation of the 
means by the type of banking partner, all firms with at least one banking partner of the respective type are used. 
Because firms might have several banking partners, the sum of the observations over the three rightmost 
columns does not equal the number of firms in the sample. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial 





Table A3: First-Stage Results 
Dependent variable: Lagged credit 




 (1) (2) 
Lagged gains from proprietary trading over financial assets 2.527*** 0.832*** 
(0.144) (0.066) 




Share of savings banks affected by the crisis 0.001*** 0.007*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
D.Business tax rate 0.175*** 0.055 
 (0.051) (0.041) 
L.D.Business tax rate -0.604*** -0.491*** 
 (0.073) (0.053) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of observations 291,079 291,079 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. The table shows the first-stage results 
for the second-stage IV regressions in Table 4 and Table 5. The first column is the first stage when overall 
credit supply is the endogenous explanatory variable, and the second column when long-term credit supply 
is considered instead. In the 2SLS estimation, the first stage is identical regardless of the dependent variable 
in the second stage. The growth rates are log approximations. D. indicates the first time difference of a 
variable, and L. indicates lagged values. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and reported in 
parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank 
financial accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences also use 2005 (2004). 
Appendix B: Supplementary figures 
Figure B1: Growth of Credit Supply from Trading and Nontrading Banks 
 
Notes: The figure shows the change in the banks’ credit supply since 2006 on a logarithmic scale. We distinguish 
banks that do not report gains or losses from proprietary trading in 2005 or 2006 (“nontrading banks”) and banks 
that do report gains or losses from proprietary trading in 2005 and 2006 (“trading banks”). 
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Figure B2: Growth of Long-Term Credit Supply from Trading and Nontrading Banks 
 
Notes: The figure shows the change in the banks’ long-term credit supply since 2006 on a logarithmic scale. 
Long-term credit supply refers to loans with a term of five years or more. We distinguish banks that do not report 
gains or losses from proprietary trading in 2005 or 2006 (“nontrading banks”) and banks that do report gains or 
losses from proprietary trading in 2005 and 2006 (“trading banks”). 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the bank financial accounts database Bankscope. 
 
Figure B3: Growth of Fixed Assets of Firms with Trading & Nontrading Relationship Banks 
 
Notes: In this figure, we distinguish firms whose relationship banks did not engage in proprietary trading in 2005 
or 2006 (“firms with nontrading banks”), firms whose relationship banks did engage in proprietary trading in 
2005 and 2006 (“firms with trading banks”), and firms with business relationships to both types of banks (“firms 
with trading and nontrading banks”). For the three groups of firms, the figure shows the change in the stock of 
fixed assets since 2006 (i.e., net real investment, on a logarithmic scale). 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial 
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Appendix C: Robustness checks 
C.1 Robustness checks on the choice of instruments in Tables 4 and 5 
Our results prove to be robust to the instrumental variables used. We consider alternative sets 
of instruments both in terms of timing and variation used. First, we vary our definition of the 
period of crisis. As explained in Section 4.2 of the main paper, to construct one of our 
instrumental variables, we interact the share of savings banks in distress in a firm’s 2006 set 
of relationship banks with a dummy variable indicating the period of crisis. In our baseline 
estimations, this is defined as 2007 and onward (Tables 4 and 5 in the main paper). Here, 
instead, we define the period of crisis as 2008 only. The rationale behind this is that the 
financial crisis hit most severely in 2008 (collapse of Lehman Brothers). Results are shown in 
Table C1, columns (1), (3) and (5). Second, as discussed in Section 4.2 in the main paper, we 
explore the share of banks with U.S. affiliates in the firm’s 2006 set of banking partners, 
interacted with 2008, as an additional excluded IV (IV set 4).49 Results appear in Table C1, 
columns (2), (4) and (6). Third, we follow Abbassi et al. (2015) and use membership of banks 
to Eurex Exchange, the largest fixed-income trading platform in Germany, as an indicator for 
active presence in securities markets. We use this indicator dummy variable as an additional 
excluded instrument. The results (not shown in the table, available on request) remain similar. 
Hansen’s over-identification test does not indicate invalid instruments in any of these 
estimations. Fourth, we use gains from proprietary trading as the only excluded instrument 
and find results qualitatively unchanged (available on request). 
In an additional set of estimations (results available on request) we repeat these 
robustness checks for long-term credit supply and find results very similar to the ones 
reported in Table 4, columns (4) to (6). 
From all these estimations, we conclude that the results are robust with respect to the 
choice of instruments. 
                                                 
49 Here we use the share of banks with U.S. affiliates in the 2006 set of a firm’s relationship banks as an 
additional control variable in both stages of the 2SLS estimations. When we use this control variable in our main 
specifications with only two instruments, the point estimate of the elasticity of interest is not significantly 
different from our baseline estimate in Table 4, column (2) and remains significant at the 1% level. We do not 
use this control variable in the main estimations because our bank data only provide information on affiliated 
banks for 2012, and we have to assume that a bank with (without) a U.S. affiliate in 2012 also had a (had no) 
U.S. affiliate in earlier years, which introduces some measurement error. 
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Table C1: Robustness Checks to Tables 4 and 5: Alternative Sets of Instruments  






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L.Credit supply, 
growth rate 
0.106*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.052*** 0.054** 0.031* 
(0.035) (0.023) (0.027) (0.019) (0.025) (0.018) 
D.Business tax rate 0.203 0.224 -0.371* -0.339 -0.242 -0.209 
 (0.247) (0.247) (0.217) (0.218) (0.256) (0.257) 
L.D.Business tax rate -0.049 -0.050 -0.578** -0.571** 0.177 0.183 
 (0.278) (0.277) (0.239) (0.238) (0.267) (0.265) 
Share of savings banks 
affected by the crisis 
0.002 0.001 0.005* 0.003 0.010*** 0.007** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Share of banks with U.S. 
affiliates 
 -0.015*  -0.023***  -0.025*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Year dummies yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.013*** 0.016*** -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of observations 291,079 291,079 291,079 291,079 36,843 36,843 
Shea’s partial R2 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.18 
1st stage F-statistic 1,299.98 6,500.67 1,299.98 6,500.67 415.10 1,229.52 
Hansen test: p-value 0.20 0.96 0.15 0.79 0.60 0.83 
Excluded instruments IV set 3 IV set 4 IV set 3 IV set 4 IV set 3 IV set 4 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. The 
dependent variable is the firm-specific growth rate in firm liabilities (columns (1) and (2)), fixed assets 
(columns (3) and (4)), and labor employment (columns (5) and (6)), respectively. The growth rates are log 
approximations. The growth rate of credit supply, the share of savings banks affected by the crisis, and the 
share of banks with U.S. affiliates pertain to the firm’s relationship bank(s). We link firms to their banking 
partners via information on individual firm–bank relationships. If a firm has multiple relationship banks, we 
calculate the mean of the growth rates of their credit supply. D. indicates the first time difference of a 
variable, and L. indicates lagged values. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***/**/* indicate 
significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. The time lag of the growth rate of credit supply is treated as 
endogenous. In the different specifications, we use alternative sets of excluded instruments: 
IV set 3: Same as IV set 2 (used in Tables 4 and 5), but with a dummy variable indicating savings banks 
affected by the crisis among a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks in 2008 (instead of 2007 and onward). 
IV set 4: Same as IV set 2 (used in Tables 4 and 5), but with the share of banks with U.S. affiliates among a 
firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks in 2008 as additional excluded IV. 
Summary: The table shows that our results on the effect of bank credit supply on firm liabilities, real 
investment, and labor employment (reported in Tables 4 and 5) are robust to the choice of instruments. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial 
accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences also use 2005 (2004). 
 
C.2 Robustness checks on specifications choices in Table 4 
In a first robustness check, we use the growth rate in firms’ bank liabilities instead of firms’ 
total liabilities as the dependent variable. Within our sample, this more detailed information is 
only available for 27,876 observations. After removing outliers pertaining to bank liabilities 
(10% of this subsample), the point estimate of the elasticity of bank liabilities is 0.109 and, 
thus, identical to the baseline point estimate in Table 4, column (2), but it comes with a fairly 
large standard error and becomes insignificant due to the small sample size.  
In a second robustness check, we also include the lagged growth rate of total assets (as a 
measure of the change in firm size) and the lagged first difference in the ratio of fixed assets 
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over total assets (as a measure of the change in tangibility or collateral). The point estimate 
and standard error of the elasticity of interest remain virtually unchanged compared with our 
main specification in Table 4, column (2). We do not include these controls in the main 
estimations because of potential endogeneity concerns (which would be even more 
pronounced in the investment equation). 
C.3 Robustness checks concerning specific firms and banks 
Firms owned by financial institutions: One might be concerned that some firms not only 
have a lending relationship with their banking partners but that these banks also own shares of 
the firms’ equity. In this case, the effects of bank distress on firm borrowing and investment 
might not only work through the bank lending and firm borrowing channel, but also directly 
through the bank’s ownership share. In two additional robustness checks, we exclude all firms 
from the sample that have i.) banks among their owners; and ii.) one of the following among 
their owners: any financial institutions or private equity or venture capital firms. The results 
with respect to firm liabilities and investment remain similar to the baseline results, so 
ownership does not appear to confound the effects we measure.  
Subsidiaries of foreign banks or real estate banks: Furthermore, subsidiaries of 
foreign banks or real estate banks may be affected by the financial crisis through their parent 
organizations. To assess whether this influences our results, in two additional robustness 
checks, we exclude firms with a relationship bank that is a subsidiary of i.) a foreign bank; 
and ii.) a real estate bank, from the estimation sample. Again we obtain similar results. 
C.4 Robustness checks using the maximum credit supply 
In the main estimations, as the key explanatory variable, we use the average growth rate of 
credit supply if a firm has more than one relationship bank. One might argue that as long as 
one of the relationship banks is healthy, the firm should not be affected by the problems of the 
other banking partners; a healthy relationship bank could make up for any contraction in loan 
supply from the firm’s other relationship banks. Therefore, in an additional robustness check, 
we use the maximum of the growth rates of credit supply from all banking partners instead of 
the average—that is, we consider a firm’s best-performing bank only. The point estimates 
from these regressions (provided in Table C2) are statistically indistinguishable from our 
baseline estimates. In summary, we conclude that our results are robust to the choice of 
instruments and to specification and sample selection choices. 
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Table C2: Robustness Check: Credit Growth of the Best-Performing Relationship Bank 
2SLS regressions of firms’ liabilities, investment and employment growth rates on the maximum 
growth rate in credit supplied by its banking partners 
Dependent variable: Firms’ liabilities, growth rate  Fixed assets, growth 
rate 
 Employment, growth 
rate 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Credit supply, maximum  
growth rate (i) 
0.019         
(0.031)         
L.Credit supply, max. 
growth rate (ii) 
0.161*** 0.130*** 0.130**  0.086*** 0.094**  0.061** 0.044 
(0.048) (0.042) (0.059)  (0.033) (0.047)  (0.030) (0.034) 
D.Business tax rate 0.206 0.196 0.732  -0.374* -0.649*  -0.232 0.149 
 (0.247) (0.247) (0.449)  (0.217) (0.377)  (0.255) (0.371) 
L.D.Business tax rate -0.019 -0.023 0.096  -0.573** -0.763**  0.202 0.384 
 (0.279) (0.280) (0.400)  (0.240) (0.344)  (0.269) (0.342) 
L.D.Sales   0.137***   0.116***   0.108*** 
   (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.010) 
Share of savings banks 
affected by the crisis 
0.004 0.003 0.001  0.005** 0.013***  0.012*** 0.013** 
(0.003) 0.130*** (0.005)  (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.006) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant 0.003 0.007 0.011  -0.004 0.004  -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.008) 
Number of observations 291,079 291,079 88,153  291,079 88,153  36,843 18,910 
Shea’s partial R2 for (i) 0.07 0.03 0.04  0.03 0.04  0.04 0.05 
1st stage F-statistic for (i) 102.39 384.00 327.67  384.00 327.67  186.86 80.68 
Shea’s partial R2 for (ii) 0.03         
1st stage F-statistic for (ii) 267.51         
Hansen test: p-value 0.41 0.78 0.19  0.53 0.31  0.43 0.56 
Excluded IVs IV set 1 IV set 2 IV set 2  IV set 2 IV set 2  IV set 2 IV set 2 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. The dependent 
variable is the firm-specific growth rate either in liabilities, in fixed assets or in labor employment. The growth rates 
are log approximations. The growth rate of credit supply and the share of savings banks affected by the crisis pertain to 
the firm’s relationship bank(s). We link firms to their banking partners via information on individual firm–bank 
relationships. If a firm has multiple relationship banks, in this table we use the maximum growth rate of (long-term) 
credit supplied by the banks. D. indicates the first time difference of a variable, and L. indicates lagged values. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level. The growth rate of credit supply and its first time lag (L.) are treated as endogenous. In the different 
specifications, we use alternative sets of excluded instruments: 
IV set 1: Proprietary trading gains and the share of savings banks affected by the crisis in 2007 and onward among a 
firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. Contemporaneous and lagged variables. 
IV set 2: As IV set 1, but with lagged variables only. 
Summary: We obtain similar results as in the main estimations in Tables 4 and 5 in the main paper when we use the 
maximum growth rate in credit supplied by a firm’s banking partners instead of the mean, i.e., when we consider the 
best performing relationship bank only. 
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial accounts 




C.5 Robustness checks concerning the adjustment channels 
Table C3: Change in Number of Banking Partners Depends on Tangibility & Firm Size 
2SLS regressions 
Dependent variable:  
Change in no. of banking partners 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Credit supply, growth rate -0.064*** -0.016 -0.048* -0.042* -0.010 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) 
Credit supply, growth rate x indicator 
for publicly listed firms (ii) 
   -1.124  
   (0.733)  
D.Business tax rate -0.379** -0.262 -0.120 -0.134 -0.496*** 
 (0.181) (0.174) (0.216) (0.217) (0.130) 
L.D.Business tax rate 0.211 0.205 0.103 0.112 0.318** 
 (0.195) (0.182) (0.229) (0.231) (0.133) 
Two banking partners in 2006 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Three banking partners in 2006 -0.077*** -0.070*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.075*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
Four banking partners in 2006 -0.157*** -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.164*** -0.152*** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.056) 
Five banking partners in 2006 -0.340*** -0.363*** -0.346*** -0.345*** -0.708** 
(0.067) (0.079) (0.052) (0.052) (0.318) 
Six banking partners in 2006 -0.642*** -0.294** -0.526*** -0.527***  
(0.170) (0.144) (0.123) (0.123)  
Share of savings banks affected  
by the crisis 
0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.001 -0.003 -0.010*** -0.011*** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Number of observations 79,779 78,981 79,713 79,713 79,047 
Shea’s partial R2 (i) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 
1st stage F-statistic (i) 19.78 21.38 24.79 21.59 17.33 
Shea’s partial R2 (ii)    0.01  
1st stage F-statistic (ii)    7.81  
Hansen test: p-value 0.47 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.47 
Excluded instruments IV set 5 IV set 5 IV set 5 IV set 6 IV set 5 
Notes: For ease of exposition the coefficients of interest are in bold. Estimations are at the firm level. D. 
indicates the first time difference of a variable, and L. indicates lagged values. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. The growth rate of credit supply is 
treated as endogenous. We use the following set of excluded instruments: 
IV set 5: Proprietary trading gains and share of savings banks affected by the crisis in 2007 and onward among 
a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. 
IV set 6: Same as IV set 5, additionally including the interaction term between the indicator for publicly listed 
firms and the proprietary trading gains among a firm’s 2006 set of relationship banks. 
Summary: The table presents estimations like in Table 8 of the main paper, but using the growth rate in credit 
supply instead of the share of banks with proprietary trading losses as the explanatory variable of interest. The 
results are qualitatively similar.  
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the firm financial accounts database Dafne and the bank financial 
accounts database Bankscope, 2006–2010; (lagged) first differences also use 2005 (2004). 
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